

FOR RELEASE JUNE 12, 2014

Political Polarization in the American Public

*How Increasing Ideological
Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy
Affect Politics, Compromise and
Everyday Life*

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
ON THIS REPORT:**

Michael Dimock, Vice President, Research
Carroll Doherty, Director of Political Research
Jocelyn Kiley, Associate Director
Russ Oates, Communications Manager
202.419.4372
www.pewresearch.org

About This Report

This is the first report of a multi-part series based on a national survey of 10,013 adults nationwide, conducted January 23-March 16, 2014 by the Pew Research Center. The survey, funded in part through grants from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and supported by the generosity of Don C. and Jeane M. Bertsch, is aimed at understanding the nature and scope of political polarization in the American public, and how it interrelates with government, society and people's personal lives.

Principal Researchers

Michael Dimock, Vice President, Research
 Jocelyn Kiley, Associate Director, Political Research
 Scott Keeter, Director of Survey Research
 Carroll Doherty, Director of Political Research

Research Team

Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Associate Director
 Kyle McGeeney, Research Methodologist
 Alec Tyson, Senior Researcher
 Rob Suls, Research Associate
 Jeffrey Gottfried, Research Associate
 Danielle Gewurz, Research Analyst
 Seth Motel, Research Analyst
 Matt Frei, Research Assistant
 Meredith Dost, Research Assistant
 Hannah Fingerhut, Research Intern

Graphic Design

Jessica Schillinger, Information Graphics Designer
 Diana Yoo, Art Director

Interactives

Adam Nekola, Web Developer
 Russell Heimlich, Web Developer

Publishing

Michael Suh, Web Production Coordinator

Acknowledgements

Colleagues from across the Pew Research Center contributed greatly to the development and execution of this research series. We would especially like to thank Alan Murray, Paul Taylor, Michael Piccorossi, Vidya Krishnamurthy, Claudia Deane, Sara Goo, Bruce Drake, Amy Mitchell, Lee Rainie and Cary Funk for their methodological and editorial contributions. Above all, we want to thank Andy Kohut, our founding director, for his wisdom and guidance, and for building this institution and establishing the rich longitudinal measures upon which this project is based.

This project has benefited greatly from the advice and counsel of many academics, journalists and political practitioners. We invited some of the nation's leading experts on political polarization to visit and discuss the topic with us and reached out to many others for ideas, data, papers and other resources. And many whom we've never met nevertheless influenced us through their published

research on the subject. In that regard, we would especially like to thank: Nancy Belden, Kelly Born, Karlyn Bowman, David Broockman, Jon Cohen, E.J. Dionne, Patrick Egan, William Galston, Craig Gilbert, Ken Goldstein, Gary Jacobson, Jon Lerner, Paul Light, Alex Lundry, Jonathan Nagler, Nathaniel Persily, David Plouffe, Markus Prior, John Sides, Daniel Stid, Joshua Tucker, Steve Waldman and Carol Wilner.

The study also benefited from methodological assistance from staff at Abt SRBI, which collected the data (Charles DiSogra, Courtney Kennedy, Mark Schulman, Chintan Turakhia, Dean Williams), and from Jim Bell, Kyle McGeeney and Steve Schwarzer of the Pew Research Center, and Douglas Steinley of the University of Missouri.

About Pew Research Center

Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world. It does not take policy positions. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. The center studies U.S. politics and policy views; media and journalism; internet and technology; religion and public life; Hispanic trends; global attitudes and U.S. social and demographic trends. All of the center's reports are available at www.pewresearch.org. Pew Research Center is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts.

Alan Murray, *President*

Michael Dimock, *Vice President, Research*

Elizabeth Mueller Gross, *Vice President*

Paul Taylor, *Executive Vice President, Special Projects*

Andrew Kohut, *Founding Director*

Managing Directors

Jim Bell, *Director of International Survey Research*

Alan Cooperman, *Director, Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project*

Claudia Deane, *Director, Research Practices*

Carroll Doherty, *Director, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press*

Scott Keeter, *Director of Survey Research*

Vidya Krishnamurthy, *Communications Director*

Mark Hugo Lopez, *Director of Hispanic Research*

Amy Mitchell, *Director of Journalism Research*

Kim Parker, *Director of Social Trends*

Lee Rainie, *Director, Pew Research Center's Internet & American Life Project*

Richard Wike, *Director of Global Attitudes*

© Pew Research Center 2014

Table of Contents

Overview	5
What Polarization Looks Like	8
More Negative Views of the Opposing Party	10
Politics Gets Personal	11
Polarization’s Consequences	13
Polarization in Red and Blue	14
About the Study	15
About the Data	16
Section 1: Growing Ideological Consistency	17
As Partisans Move Further Apart, the Middle Shrinks	18
Is Polarization Asymmetrical?	22
Political Engagement Increasingly Linked to Polarization	23
Polarization among Elected Officials	26
Growing Partisan Polarization Spans Domains	26
Ideological Self-Placement and Ideological Consistency	29
Section 2: Growing Partisan Antipathy	31
Ideology and Partisan Antipathy Increasingly Intertwined	33
A Deep-Seated Dislike, Bordering on Sense of Alarm	34
Republican Antipathy toward Obama	35
Antipathy and Engagement	39
Section 3: Political Polarization and Personal Life	41
The Ideal Community: Different for Liberals than for Conservatives	44
What’s Important in a Community?	45
Marrying Across Party Lines	47
Consistent Liberals, Conservatives Talk Politics More Often	50
The Ideological Echo Chamber	51
Dislike the Party, Avoid the People	52


Polarized Views of Cable News	53
Section 4: Political Compromise and Divisive Policy Debates	55
'50/50' Agreements Preferred by Public	57
The Ideological "Center" Is Not Necessarily "Moderate"	59
Section 5: Political Engagement and Activism	70
Partisan Antipathy and Political Engagement	72
Polarization and the Primaries	73
More Politically Engaged, But Not a Majority	75
For Further Reading	77
Appendix A: The Ideological Consistency Scale	79
Appendix B: Why We Include Leaners With Partisans	83
About the Surveys	87
Overview of Telephone Survey Methodology	87
Telephone Survey Methodology in Detail	89
The American Trends Panel Survey	92
Survey Toplines	94

Overview

Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines – and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive – than at any point in the last two decades. These trends manifest themselves in myriad ways, both in politics and in everyday life. And a new survey of 10,000 adults nationwide finds that these divisions are greatest among those who are the most engaged and active in the political process.

Democrats and Republicans More Ideologically Divided than in the Past

Distribution of Democrats and Republicans on a 10-item scale of political values



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). The blue area in this chart represents the ideological distribution of Democrats; the red area of Republicans. The overlap of these two distributions is shaded purple. Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B). See the online edition of this report for an [animated version](#) of this graphic.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The overall share of Americans who express consistently conservative or consistently liberal opinions has doubled over the past two decades from 10% to 21%. And ideological thinking is now much more closely aligned with partisanship than in the past. As a result, ideological overlap between the two parties has diminished: Today, 92% of Republicans are to the right of the median Democrat, and 94% of Democrats are to the left of the median Republican.


Partisan animosity has increased substantially over the same period. In each party, the share with a highly negative view of the opposing party has more than doubled since 1994. Most of these

intense partisans believe the opposing party's policies "are so misguided that they threaten the nation's well-being."

Beyond Dislike: Viewing the Other Party as a 'Threat to the Nation's Well-Being'

Democratic attitudes about the Republican Party

Republican attitudes about the Democratic Party



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Questions about whether the Republican and Democratic Parties are a threat to the nation's well being asked only in 2014. Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

"Ideological silos" are now common on both the left and right. People with down-the-line ideological positions – especially conservatives – are more likely than others to say that most of their close friends share their political views. Liberals and conservatives disagree over where they want to live, the kind of people they want to live around and even whom they would welcome into their families.

And at a time of increasing gridlock on Capitol Hill, many on both the left and the right think the outcome of political negotiations between Obama and Republican leaders should be that their side gets more of what it wants.

These sentiments are not shared by all – or even most – Americans. The majority do not have uniformly conservative or liberal views. Most do not see either party as a threat to the nation. And more believe their representatives in government should meet halfway to resolve contentious disputes rather than hold out for more of what they want.

Yet many of those in the center remain on the edges of the political playing field, relatively distant and disengaged, while the most ideologically oriented and politically rancorous Americans make their voices heard through greater participation in every stage of the political process.

The rise of ideological uniformity has been much more pronounced among those who are the most politically active. Today, almost four-in-ten (38%) politically engaged Democrats are consistent liberals, up from just 8% in 1994. The change among Republicans since then appears less dramatic – 33% express consistently conservative views, up from 23% in the midst of the 1994 “Republican Revolution.” But a decade ago, just 10% of politically engaged Republicans had across-the-board conservative attitudes.


Political Activism Gap: Right and Left More Likely to Vote, Donate to Campaigns



Percent who **always** vote



Percent who contributed to a **political** candidate or group in the past two years



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Bars represent the level of participation at each point on an ideological consistency scale of 10 political values questions. Figures are reported on the five ideological consistency groups used throughout the report (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


On measure after measure – whether primary voting, writing letters to officials, volunteering for or donating to a campaign – the most politically polarized are more actively involved in politics, amplifying the voices that are the least willing to see the parties meet each other halfway.

These are among the findings of the largest study of U.S. political attitudes ever undertaken by the Pew Research Center. Data are drawn from a national telephone survey of 10,013 adults, conducted from January through March of this year, and an ongoing series of follow-up surveys. This rich dataset, coupled with trends and insights from two decades of Pew Research Center polling, reveals a complex picture of partisan polarization and how it manifests itself in political behaviors, policy debates, election dynamics and everyday life.

What Polarization Looks Like

Growing Minority Holds Consistent Ideological Views

On a 10-item scale of political values, % who are...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions. (See Appendix A for details on how the scale is constructed and how scores are grouped.)


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

To chart the progression of ideological thinking, responses to 10 political values questions asked on multiple Pew Research surveys since 1994 have been combined to create a measure of ideological consistency ([See Appendix A](#)). Over the past twenty years, the number of Americans in the “tails” of this ideological distribution has doubled from 10% to 21%. Meanwhile, the center has shrunk: 39% currently take a roughly equal number of liberal and conservative positions. That is down from about half (49%) of the public in surveys conducted in 1994 and 2004.

And this shift represents both Democrats moving to the left and Republicans moving to the right, with less and less overlap between the parties. Today, 92% of Republicans are to the right of the median (middle) Democrat, compared with 64% twenty years ago. And 94% of Democrats are to the left of the median Republican, up from 70% in 1994.

Republicans Shift to the Right, Democrats to the Left

Distribution of Republicans and Democrats on a 10-item scale of political values



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public.

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


More Negative Views of the Opposing Party

Beyond the rise in ideological consistency, another major element in polarization has been the growing contempt that many Republicans and Democrats have for the opposing party. To be sure, disliking the other party is nothing new in politics. But today, these sentiments are broader and deeper than in the recent past.


In 1994, hardly a time of amicable partisan relations, a majority of Republicans had unfavorable impressions of the Democratic Party, but just 17% had *very* unfavorable opinions. Similarly, while most Democrats viewed the GOP unfavorably, just 16% had *very* unfavorable views. Since then, highly negative views have more than doubled: 43% of Republicans and 38% of Democrats now view the opposite party in strongly negative terms.

A Rising Tide of Mutual Antipathy

Democratic attitudes about the Republican Party



Republican attitudes about the Democratic Party



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


Even these numbers tell only part of the story. Those who have a very unfavorable impression of each party were asked: “Would you say the party’s policies are so misguided that they threaten the nation’s well-being, or wouldn’t you go that far?” Most who were asked the question said yes, they would go that far. Among all Democrats, 27% say the GOP is a threat to the well-being of the country. That figure is even higher among Republicans, 36% of whom think Democratic policies threaten the nation.

Politics Gets Personal

Liberals and conservatives share a passion for politics. They are far more likely than those with more mixed ideological views to discuss politics on a weekly or daily basis. But for many, particularly on the right, those conversations may not include much in the way of opposing opinions.

Ideological Echo Chambers

% who say ...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


Nearly two-thirds (63%) of consistent conservatives and about half (49%) of consistent liberals say most of their close friends share their political views. Among those with mixed ideological values, just 25% say the same. People on the right and left also are more likely to say it is important to them to live in a place where most people share their political views, though again, that desire is more widespread on the right (50%) than on the left (35%).

And while few Americans overall go so far as to voice disappointment with the prospect of a family member marrying a Democrat (8%) or a Republican (9%), that sentiment is not uncommon on the left or the right. Three-out-of-ten (30%) consistent conservatives say they would be unhappy if an immediate family member married a Democrat and about a quarter (23%) of across-the-board liberals say the same about the prospect of a Republican in-law.

To be sure, there are areas of consensus. Most Americans, regardless of their ideological preferences, value communities in which they would live close to extended family and high-quality schools. But far more liberals than conservatives think it is important that a community have racial and ethnic diversity (76% vs. 20%). At the same time, conservatives are more likely than liberals to attach importance to living in a place where many people share their religious faith (57% vs. 17% of liberals).

Liberals Want Walkable Communities, Conservatives Prefer More Room

Would you prefer to live in a community where...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). "Don't know" responses not shown.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


And the differences between right and left go beyond disagreements over politics, friends and neighbors. If they could choose anywhere to live, three-quarters of consistent conservatives prefer a community where "the houses are larger and farther apart, but schools, stores, and restaurants are several miles away." The preferences of consistent liberals are almost the exact inverse, with 77% saying they'd chose to live where "the houses are smaller and closer to each other, but schools, stores, and restaurants are within walking distance."

Polarization's Consequences

When they look at a political system in which little seems to get done, most Americans in the center of the electorate think that Obama and Republican leaders should simply meet each other halfway in addressing the issues facing the nation.

Compromise in the Eye of the Beholder

When Barack Obama and Republican leaders differ over the most important issues facing the country, where should things end up?



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
 Notes: Question asks respondents where, on a scale of zero to 100, Obama and Republican leaders should end up when addressing the most important issues facing the country. See topline for complete question wording. Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Yet an equitable deal is in the eye of the beholder, as both liberals and conservatives define the optimal political outcome as one in which their side gets more of what it wants. A majority of consistent conservatives (57%) say the ideal agreement between President Obama and congressional Republicans is one in which GOP leaders hold out for more of their goals. Consistent liberals take the opposite view: Their preferred terms (favored by 62%) end up closer to Obama's position than the GOP's.

Polarization in Red and Blue


The signs of political polarization are evident on both ends of the political spectrum, though the trajectory, nature and extent differ from left to right.

With Barack Obama in the White House, partisan antipathy is more pronounced among Republicans, especially consistently conservative Republicans. Overall, more Republicans than Democrats see the opposing party's policies as a threat and the differences are even greater when ideology is taken into account. Fully 66% of consistently conservative Republicans think the Democrats' policies threaten the nation's well-being. By comparison, half (50%) of consistently liberal Democrats say Republican policies jeopardize the nation's well-being. Conservatives also exhibit more partisan behavior in their personal lives; they are the most likely to have friends and prefer communities of like-minded people.


However, there is as much ideological uniformity on the left as the right. The share of Democrats holding consistently liberal views has grown steadily over the past 20 years, quadrupling from 5% in 1994 to 23% today. Social issues like homosexuality and immigration that once drove deep divides within the Democratic Party are now areas of relative consensus. And Democrats have become more uniformly critical of business and more supportive of government.

More Democrats Take Liberal Positions, More Republicans Take Conservative Positions

Percent of Democrats with political values that are...



Percent of Republicans with political values that are...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Changes in ideological consistency on the right have followed a different course. In 1994, during the “Republican Revolution,” 13% of Republicans were consistent conservatives. That figure *fell* to 6% a decade later during George W. Bush’s presidency, before rebounding to 20% today. This increase has come despite more moderate views among Republicans on issues like homosexuality and immigration, as GOP thinking on issues related to government and the economy has veered sharply to the right.

About the Study

This is the first report of a multi-part series based on a national survey of 10,013 adults nationwide, conducted January 23-March 16, 2014 by the Pew Research Center. The survey, funded in part through grants from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and supported by the generosity of Don C. and Jeane M. Bertsch, is aimed at understanding the nature and scope of political polarization in the American public, and how it interrelates with government, society and people’s personal lives.

The second report, coming in a few weeks, is the new Pew Research Center *Political Typology*. The typology – the sixth such study since 1987 – looks beyond Red vs. Blue divisions to gain a clearer understanding of the dynamic nature of the “center” of the American electorate, and the internal divides on both the left and the right.

Later, the project will explore the various factors that contribute to political polarization, or stem from it. A September report will examine how political polarization is linked to people’s information environments: Their news sources, social media habits and interpersonal communication networks. Other reports will look at how political polarization relates to where people live, to their political environments, to how they view themselves and others around them, to their socioeconomic circumstances, to generational changes and to broader sociological and psychological personality traits.

The current report is divided into five parts: The first two focus on measuring the *nature and scope* of political polarization, emphasizing the difference between growing ideological consistency and rising partisan antipathy. The third looks closely at how polarization manifests itself in people’s *personal lives*. The fourth looks at the relationship between polarization and *practical policymaking*, and the fifth digs deeper into how *political participation* both amplifies and reflects polarization.

About the Data

The data in this report are based on two independent survey administrations with the same randomly selected, nationally representative group of respondents. The first is the center’s largest survey on domestic politics to date: the 2014 Political Polarization and Typology Survey, a national telephone survey of 10,013 adults, on landlines and cell phones, from January through March of this year. The second involved impaneling a subset of these respondents into the newly created American Trends Panel and following up with them via a survey conducted by web and telephone. The two surveys are described separately, in further detail, in the [About the Surveys](#) section of the report.

Section 1: Growing Ideological Consistency

A decade ago, the public was less ideologically consistent than it is today. In 2004, only about one-in-ten Americans were uniformly liberal or conservative across most values. Today, the share who are ideologically consistent has doubled: 21% express either consistently liberal or conservative opinions across a range of issues – the size and scope of government, the environment, foreign policy and many others.

The new survey finds that as ideological consistency has become more common, it has become increasingly aligned with partisanship. Looking at 10 political values questions tracked since 1994, more Democrats now give uniformly liberal responses, and more Republicans give uniformly conservative responses than at any point in the last 20 years.

To be sure, those with across-the-board liberal or conservative views remain in the minority; most Americans continue to express at least some mix of liberal and conservative attitudes. Yet those who express ideologically consistent views have disproportionate influence on the political process: They are more likely than those with mixed views to vote regularly and far more likely to donate to political campaigns and contact elected officials ([See section 5](#)).

Moreover, consistent liberals and conservatives approach the give-and-take of politics very differently than do those with mixed ideological views. Ideologically consistent Americans generally believe the other side – not their own – should do the giving. Those in the middle, by contrast, think both sides should give ground ([See section 4](#)).

How We Define “Ideological Consistency”

Throughout this report we utilize a scale composed of 10 questions asked on Pew Research Center surveys going back to 1994 to gauge peoples’ ideological worldview. The questions cover a range of political values including attitudes about size and scope of government, the social safety net, immigration, homosexuality, business, the environment, foreign policy and racial discrimination. The individual items are discussed at the end of this section, and full details about the scale are in [appendix A](#).

The scale is designed to measure how consistently liberal or conservative people’s responses are across these various dimensions of political thinking (what some refer to as ideological ‘constraint’). Other sections of the report look at people’s levels of partisanship, engagement and policy views. Where people fall on this scale does not always align with whether they think of themselves as liberal, moderate or conservative. See the discussion at the end of this section for this analysis.

Why We Include “Leaners” in the Republican and Democratic Groups

Throughout most of this report, Republicans and Democrats include independents who lean toward the parties. In virtually all situations, these Republican and Democratic leaners have far more in common with their partisan counterparts than they do with each other if combined into a single “independent” group. See [appendix B](#) for more detail.


As Partisans Move Further Apart, the Middle Shrinks

In 2012, the Pew Research Center [updated its 25-year study of the public's political values](#), finding that the partisan gap in opinions on more than 40 separate political values had nearly doubled over the previous quarter century. The new study investigates whether there is greater ideological consistency than in the past; that is, whether more people now have straight-line liberal or conservative attitudes across a range of issues, from homosexuality and immigration to foreign policy, the environment, economic policy and the role of government.

The graphic below shows the extent to which members of both parties have become more ideologically consistent and, as a result, further from one another. When responses to 10 questions are scaled together to create a measure of ideological consistency, the median (middle) Republican is now more conservative than nearly all Democrats (94%), and the median Democrat is more liberal than 92% of Republicans.

Democrats and Republicans More Ideologically Divided than in the Past

Distribution of Democrats and Republicans on a 10-item scale of political values



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). The blue area in this chart represents the ideological distribution of Democrats; the red area of Republicans. The overlap of these two distributions is shaded purple. Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B). See the online edition of this report for an [animated version](#) of this graphic.


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

In 1994, the overlap was much greater than it is today. Twenty years ago, the median Democrat was to the left of 64% of Republicans, while the median Republican was to the right of 70% of Democrats. Put differently, in 1994 23% of Republicans were *more liberal* than the median

Democrat; while 17% of Democrats were *more conservative* than the median Republican. Today, those numbers are just 4% and 5%, respectively.

Republicans Shift to the Right, Democrats to the Left

Distribution of Republicans and Democrats on a 10-item scale of political values



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


As partisans have moved to the left and the right, the share of Americans with mixed views has declined. Across the 10 ideological values questions in the scale, 39% of Americans currently take a roughly equal number of liberal and conservative positions. That is down from nearly half (49%) of the public in surveys conducted in 1994 and 2004. As noted, the proportion of Americans who are now more uniformly ideological has doubled over the last decade: About one-in-five Americans

(21%) are now either consistently liberal (12%) or consistently conservative (9%) in their political values, up from just one-in-ten in 2004 (11%) and 1994 (10%).

More Democrats Take Liberal Positions, More Republicans Take Conservative Positions

Percent of Democrats with political values that are...

Percent of Republicans with political values that are...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

This translates into a growing number of Republicans and Democrats who are on completely opposite sides of the ideological spectrum, making it harder to find common ground in policy debates. The share of Democrats who hold consistently liberal positions has quadrupled over the course of the last 20 years, growing from just 5% in 1994 to 13% in 2004 to 23% today. And more Republicans are consistently conservative than in the past (20% today, up from 6% in 2004 and 13% in 1994), even as the country as a whole has shifted slightly to the left on the 10 item scale.


Are They “Ideologues?” Value Sorting vs. Extreme Views

Being ideologically consistent does not equate to being politically “extreme” – an important distinction in understanding polarization. This is one reason why we avoid using the term “ideologue” to describe those on the tails of the ideological consistency scale.

Section 4 of the report explores the relationship between being ideologically consistent and holding positions on the periphery of current policy debates—finding evidence that those who are ideologically mixed are often as likely to hold more “extreme” positions as those who are more ideologically consistent. Conversely, one can be uniformly liberal (or conservative) in one’s political values, but have a “moderate” approach to issues.

Growing Minority Holds Consistent Ideological Views

On a 10-item scale of political values, % who are...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions. (See Appendix A for details on how the scale is constructed and how scores are grouped.)

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Is Polarization Asymmetrical?

The ideological consolidation nationwide has happened on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, but the long-term shift among Democrats stands out as particularly noteworthy. The share of Democrats who are liberal on all or most value dimensions has nearly doubled from just 30% in 1994 to 56% today. The share who are *consistently* liberal has quadrupled from just 5% to 23% over the past 20 years.

In absolute terms, the ideological shift among Republicans has been more modest, in 1994, 45% of Republicans were right-of-center, with 13% consistently conservative. Those figures are up to 53% and 20% today.

But there are two key considerations to keep in mind before concluding that the liberals are driving ideological polarization. First, 1994 was a relative high point in conservative political thinking among Republicans. In fact, between 1994 and 2004 the average Republican moved substantially toward the center ideologically, as concern about the deficit, government waste and abuses of social safety net that characterized the “Contract with America” era faded in the first term of the Bush administration.

But since 2004, Republicans have veered sharply back to the right on all of these dimensions, and the GOP ideological shift over the past decade has matched, if not exceeded, the rate at which Democrats have become more liberal.

A second consideration is that the nation as a whole has moved slightly to the left over the past 20 years, mostly because of a broad societal shift toward acceptance of homosexuality and more positive views of immigrants. Twenty years ago, these two issues created significant cleavages within the Democratic Party, as many otherwise liberal Democrats expressed more conservative values in these realms. But today, as divisions over these issues have diminished on the left, they have emerged on the right, with a subset of otherwise conservative Republicans expressing more liberal values on these social issues.

However, on economic issues and the role of government, Republicans and Democrats are both substantially more consolidated than in the past: 37% of Republicans are consistently conservative and 36% of Democrats are consistently liberal on a five-item subset of the scale restricted to just the items about economic policy and the size of government. In 1994, those proportions were 23% and 21%, respectively.

Political Engagement Increasingly Linked to Polarization


In today's political environment, party (and partisan leaning) predicts ideological consistency more than ever before, and this is particularly the case among the politically attentive. Among Americans who keep up with politics and government and who regularly vote, fully 99% of Republicans are now more conservative than the median Democrat, while 98% of Democrats are more liberal than the median Republican. While engaged partisans have always been ideologically divided, there was more overlap in the recent past; just 10 years ago these numbers were 88% and 84%, respectively.

Polarization Surges Among the Politically Engaged


Distribution of Democrats and Republicans on a 10-item scale of political values, by level of political engagement

Among the politically engaged


1994






2004



2014



Among the less engaged



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public


Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B). Politically engaged are defined as those who are registered to vote, follow government and public affairs most of the time and say they vote always or nearly always.

Today, almost four-in-ten (38%) politically engaged Democrats are consistent liberals, up from only 8% in 1994 and 20% in 2004. And the rise is also evident on the right: 33% of politically engaged Republicans are consistent conservatives, up from 23% in 1994, and just 10% in 2004.

Within both parties, 70% of the politically engaged now take positions that are mostly or consistently in line with the ideological bent of their party. By comparison, the equivalent positions were held by 58% of Republicans and 35% of Democrats in 1994 and 40% of Republicans and 59% of Democrats in 2004.

Engaged citizens have always tended to be more ideologically oriented, but the correlation has increased in recent years, particularly among Democrats. Today, 70% of highly engaged Democrats are mostly or consistently liberal in their views, compared with about half (49%) of less engaged Democrats (the other half are either ideologically mixed or conservative). Twenty years ago, there was far less of an engagement gap in ideological thinking, as 35% of highly engaged and 28% of less engaged Democrats were left of center.

Growth in Ideological Polarization Sharper among Politically Engaged



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
 Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The shift in ideology among Republicans is more complex. Between 1994 and 2004 Republicans actually became *less* ideologically oriented, as support for government programs and more positive views about the effectiveness of government grew during George W. Bush's first term. But over the past decade, the GOP has moved solidly to the right – particularly those who are more politically engaged. Today, 70% of highly engaged Republicans are either consistently or mostly conservative, up from 40% in 2004. By comparison, just 38% of less engaged Republicans are right of center (the majority offer a mix of liberal and conservative views).

Defining Political Engagement

Participation in politics is one of the key correlates of polarization, and is measured in greater detail in a separate section of this report. Because the analysis here is making comparisons over time, we are limited to using three questions that were asked consistently in Pew Research surveys since 1994. To be classified as “highly engaged,” a respondent must say they are registered to vote, always or nearly always vote, and follow what is going on in government and public affairs most of the time. In each year of the study, this represents roughly a third of the public, while the other two-thirds are classified as “less engaged.”

The 2014 survey goes into far greater detail on various forms of political participation and engagement, with more detail here ([See section 5](#)).

Polarization among Elected Officials

This movement among the public, and particularly the engaged public, tracks with increasingly polarized voting patterns in Congress, though to a far lesser extent. As many congressional scholars have documented, Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill are now further apart from one another than at any point in modern history, and that rising polarization among elected officials is asymmetrical, [with much of the widening gap between the two parties attributable to a rightward shift among Republicans](#). As a result, [using a widely accepted metric of ideological positioning](#), there is now no overlap between the two parties; in the last full session of Congress (the 112th Congress, which ran from 2011-12), every Republican senator and representative was more conservative than the most conservative Democrat (or, putting it another way, every Democrat was more liberal than the most liberal Republican).

But this was not always the case. Forty years ago, in the 93rd Congress (1973-74), fully 240 representatives and 29 senators were in between the most liberal Republican and most conservative Democrat in their respective chambers. Twenty years ago (the 103rd Congress from 1993-94) had nine representatives and three senators in between the most liberal Republican and most conservative Democrat in their respective chambers. Today, there is no overlap. And while by this measure the pace of change may appear to have slowed in the past 20 years, the ideological distance between members of the two parties has continued to grow steadily over this period.

Growing Partisan Polarization Spans Domains

The growth in partisan polarization is evident across a range of political values, as nearly all of the traditional gaps between Republicans and Democrats have widened. The results of the current survey echo the findings in [the 2012 values study](#).


The current survey tracks trends on a different set of questions going back to 1994, with parallel conclusions: Partisan divides have deepened across most core political domains, including on nearly every measure in the ideological consistency scale.

For instance, while Democrats have always been more supportive than Republicans of the social safety net, the partisan divide on these questions has increased substantially over the last 20 years. Two-thirds of Republicans (66%) believe that “poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing anything in return;” just 25% say “poor people have hard lives because government benefits don't go far enough to help them live decently.” Among Democrats, just 28% believe the poor have it easy. The partisan gap on this measure is now 38 points, up from 19 points in 1994 and 26 points in 2004.

Similarly, in 1994, there was a relatively narrow 10-point partisan gap in views on environmental regulation. Today, the gap is 35 points, as the proportion of Republicans who say that “stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy” has grown from 39% in 1994 to 59%, while Democratic opinion has shifted slightly in the other direction.

Growing Gaps between Republicans and Democrats

% who take the *more conservative* position on each question in the ideological consistency scale



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Line charts show the survey questions included in the 10-item ideological consistency scale. Questions are forced-choice questions with two options; only the conservative responses are shown here. See topline for the full question wording and trends for each question.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

And although immigration attitudes have shifted in a liberal direction among both Democrats and Republicans, a partisan gap has emerged where none was evident 20 years ago. In 1994, 64% of Republicans and 62% of Democrats viewed immigrants as a burden on the country; today 46% of Republicans but just 27% of Democrats say this.

For nine of the 10 items in the ideological consistency scale, the partisan gap has grown wider over the last 20 years. The sole exception is in views of homosexuality: Both Democrats and Republicans have become more liberal on this question over the years, as fewer now say that “homosexuality should be discouraged (rather than accepted) by society.” However, the current 21-point partisan gap on this question is only slightly wider than the 16 point gap in 1994.

Ideological Self-Placement and Ideological Consistency

Where people fall on the scale of ideological consistency discussed throughout this report is strongly correlated with how people describe themselves. But for some, how they see their own ideology doesn't align with their expressed political values.

In recent years, Americans have consistently been [far more likely to self-identify as conservative than as liberal](#) – by a 36% to 23% margin in the current survey.

Fully 84% of those who are consistently conservative in their ideological positions call themselves conservative, as does a smaller majority (61%) of those who are “mostly conservative” on the scale.


But those who express consistently or mostly liberal values, are less likely to embrace the “liberal” label.

About six-in-ten (62%)

consistent liberals say they are liberal, with 31% saying they are moderate, and a handful (6%) calling themselves conservative. And among those who are mostly liberal on the ideological consistency scale, more (44%) say they are moderate than say they are liberal (32%).

While the plurality (42%) of those who are ideologically mixed label themselves as moderate, the remainder are more likely to say they are conservative (33%) than liberal (19%).

Ideological Self-Placement Mostly Corresponds to Political Values, With Some Exceptions



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public


Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). Ideological self-placement based on one question with five response options.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


Section 2: Growing Partisan Antipathy

A Rising Tide of Mutual Antipathy

Democratic attitudes about the Republican Party



Republican attitudes about the Democratic Party



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

There is nothing new about Republicans disliking the Democratic Party or, conversely, Democrats not liking the GOP. But the level of antipathy that members of each party feel toward the opposing party has surged over the past two decades. Not only do greater numbers of those in both parties have negative views of the other side, those negative views are increasingly intense. And today, many go so far as to say that the opposing party's policies threaten the nation's well-being.

Though negative ratings of the other party were common 20 years ago, relatively few Republicans and Democrats had deeply negative opinions. In 1994, when the GOP captured the House and Senate after a bitter midterm campaign, about two-thirds (68%) of Republicans and Republican leaners had an unfavorable opinion of the Democratic Party, but just 17% had a *very* unfavorable opinion. At the same time, though a majority of Democrats and Democratic leaners (57%) viewed the GOP unfavorably, just 16% had a *very* unfavorable view. Today, negative ratings have risen overall (about eight-in-ten of both Republicans and Democrats rate the other party unfavorably), but deeply negative views have more than doubled: 38% of Democrats and 43% of Republicans now view the opposite party in strongly negative terms. The rise in negative views of the opposing

party is also seen in “feeling thermometer” ratings in the American National Election Studies, as [partisans now give “cooler” ratings to the opposing party than they did in the past](#).

The survey finds that this strong dislike verges on alarm for many. In both political parties, most of those who view the other party very unfavorably say that the other side’s policies “are so misguided that they threaten the nation’s well-being.” Overall, 36% of Republicans and Republican leaners say that Democratic policies threaten the nation, while 27% of Democrats and Democratic leaners view GOP policies in equally stark terms.


This kind of hostility toward the opposing party is strongly related to political participation and activism. For example, 54% of Republicans and 46% of Democrats who have made campaign donations in the past two years describe the other political party as a threat to the nation. In other words, those who arguably have the greatest impact on politics are most likely to have strongly negative feelings toward the opposing party.

And among members of both parties, intense dislike of the political opposition – like ideological polarization – is strongly linked to other views and behaviors as well, such as how willing people are to support compromise in Washington ([See section 4](#)), and how they view personal interactions with people from the other political party ([See section 3](#))

The growing partisan antipathy detailed here is one major aspect of political polarization. Another is ideological polarization – the growing share of Americans who hold consistently liberal or conservative views across a wide range of issues ([See section 1](#)). These trends are connected, but not identical, and both ideological consistency and partisan antipathy individually are important elements of the broader polarized landscape.

Ideology and Partisan Antipathy Increasingly Intertwined

The Growing Link between Ideology and Partisan Antipathy



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
 Note: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


Twenty years ago, fewer Americans were consistently liberal or conservative in their views about politics and society and even those who were ideologically oriented did not express the animosity toward the other side that is common today. In 1994 – hardly a moment of goodwill and compromise in American politics – just 23% of consistent liberals expressed a very unfavorable view of the Republican Party. And just 28% of consistent conservatives saw the Democratic Party in equally negative terms.

But today, the majority of ideologically-oriented Americans hold deeply negative views of the other side. This is particularly true on the right, as 72% of consistent conservatives have a very unfavorable opinion of the Democratic Party. Consistent liberals do not feel as negatively toward the GOP; nonetheless, 53% of consistent liberals have very unfavorable impressions of the GOP, more than double the share that did so two decades ago.

A Deep-Seated Dislike, Bordering on Sense of Alarm

Seeing the Other Party as a Threat to Nation

% saying (Republican/Democratic) Party policies “are so misguided that they threaten the nation’s well-being”



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

At a time of historically low levels of trust in government and other national institutions, expressing a “very unfavorable” opinion of the opposing political party may not seem like a signal of intense hostility. However, when given the chance to express even stronger criticism, most who hold highly negative views of the opposing party do so.

After expressing a very unfavorable view of one or the other party, respondents were asked: “Would you say the party’s policies are so misguided that they threaten the nation’s well-being, or wouldn’t you go that far?” The question was intentionally designed to suggest that this was a high bar; nevertheless, the vast majority of those who were asked the question agreed. Among all Democrats and Democratic leaners, 27% go so far as to say the GOP is a threat to the well-being of the country. Among all Republicans and Republican leaners, more than a third (36%) say Democratic policies threaten the nation.

Republican Antipathy toward Obama

While there are plenty on both the left and the right who express these levels of antipathy toward the other side, there is substantially more anger among conservatives than among liberals. At the most extreme, two-thirds (66%) of consistently conservative Republicans see the Democratic Party as a threat to the nation's well-being, compared with the half (50%) of consistently liberal Democrats who say the same about the Republican Party. And this concern reaches well beyond the right wing of the Republican Party, as nearly half (46%) of mostly conservative Republicans see the Democratic Party as a threat to the nation's well-being; by contrast, 22% of mostly liberal Democrats see the GOP as a threat.


At least in part, the strongly negative views Republicans have of the Democratic Party reflect their deep-seated dislike of Barack Obama. In the current survey, just 12% of Republicans and Republican leaners say they approve of the job Obama is doing in office, while 84% disapprove, including 71% who *very strongly* disapprove.

This impassioned Republican discontent has persisted from the [early days of Obama's presidency](#), yet it is only the latest instance of a longer pattern in how the public assesses its presidents. There has been a steadily growing level of partisan division over presidential performance over the past 60 years, and it is driven almost entirely by broader disapproval from the opposition party, not by greater loyalty among the president's party. And in that regard, the phenomenon is not limited to Republicans. At a comparable point in George W. Bush's presidency eight years ago, Democratic disapproval of Bush's job performance was on par with Republicans' ratings of Obama today; in April 2006, 87% of Democrats and Democratic leaners disapproved of Bush's job performance, and 75% *very strongly* disapproved.

Modern presidents, from Dwight Eisenhower through Barack Obama, have generally enjoyed a job approval rating of around 80% from their own partisan base. The exceptions are the lower ratings Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and George W. Bush received from within their parties in their difficult final years in office, and the distinct lack of enthusiasm Democrats expressed for Jimmy Carter through most his presidency. Obama’s job approval rating among Democrats (on average, 81% approval over the course of his presidency so far) has been roughly the same as Republicans’ ratings for two of the party’s icons – Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and Eisenhower in the 1950s (88%).

Polarization and Presidential Approval: Supporters Stay Loyal, Opposition Intensifies

% approving of president’s job performance, by party



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Data from Eisenhower through George H. W. Bush from Gallup. Because some earlier data did not include partisan leaning, Republicans and Democrats in this graphic do not include leaners.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


By comparison, the views of people in the opposing party have become steadily more negative. From 1953-1960, an average of nearly half (49%) of Democrats said they approved of the job Republican president Dwight Eisenhower was doing in office. Over the course of Reagan's presidency, nearly a third (31%) of Democrats approved of his job performance. Just over a quarter (27%) of Republicans offered a positive assessment of Bill Clinton between 1993 and 2000. But the two most recent presidents have not received even this minimal support. George W. Bush's job ratings among Democrats were relatively strong in the post-9/11 period, but in the last five years of his presidency, only 12% of Democrats, on average, approved of his job performance. That is similar to Obama's ratings among Republicans (14% on average) over the course of his presidency.

Not only have partisans become more uniform in their disapproval of presidents from the other party, they are also more inclined to express deeply negative personal evaluations of the men holding the office. Most Republicans (78%) have an unfavorable opinion of Obama, and 45% rate him *very* unfavorably. Those ratings represent an improvement in GOP views of Obama. In the midst of the government shutdown and debt limit negotiations last October, 88% viewed him unfavorably, with 62% saying their opinion was very unfavorable.

But this is not unique to Republican views of Obama. Democratic views of George W. Bush reached similar territory during his second term, as the war in Iraq became a partisan dividing line compounded by reactions to other aspects of Bush's presidency, including his handling of Hurricane Katrina. By April 2008, nearly nine-in-ten Democrats had unfavorable views of Bush – 66% viewed him very unfavorably.

Intensely Negative Views of Obama and Bush from Opposing Party

% of the other party with very unfavorable view of the president



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B).





PEW RESEARCH CENTER

By contrast, this level of deeply negative personal evaluations from the opposing side wasn't as evident during Bill Clinton's presidency. Even as clear majorities of Republicans expressed unfavorable opinions of Bill Clinton during his time in office, the proportion saying their opinion was *very* unfavorable peaked at 47%.

Antipathy and Engagement

Holding deeply negative views of the opposite party and its leaders is correlated with political participation, and this is particularly true among Republicans in the current context. Republicans who hold a *very* unfavorable opinion of the Democratic Party are 18 points more likely than those whose opinion is *mostly* unfavorable to say they always vote. They are also almost twice as likely to have made a donation to a campaign or candidate (23% vs. 12%). Importantly, how Republicans view their own political party has little association with their participation in these ways. Those who hold *very favorable* views of the GOP are no more or less likely to be politically active than those with less favorable views.

Voting, Donations Linked to Negative Views of the Other Party



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


The same pattern exists when it comes to Democratic campaign donors. Democrats with a very unfavorable opinion of the GOP are substantially more likely than those who feel only mostly unfavorably to have made a donation in the past two years (22% vs. 14%). But there are no differences in self-reported donations among Democrats who have a very favorable opinion of their own party and those who have a mostly favorable view. Yet when it comes to voting among Democrats, strong views of both political parties tend to matter. Democrats who view the GOP very unfavorably are 12 points more likely to always vote than those who only mostly dislike the Republican Party. But those who feel very positively about their own party are also 12 points more likely to always vote than those who are only mostly positive.

As we show elsewhere, both partisan animosity and ideological consistency are linked to [higher levels of political participation](#), and in fact the effect is compounded among those who think both in ideological and partisan terms. And both also affect how Americans view [negotiations and compromise](#) in Washington and even [how people interact with those around them](#). As partisan antipathy and ideological consistency have grown, each contributes substantially to a more polarized political environment in elections, in Washington and in society more generally.

Section 3: Political Polarization and Personal Life

Liberals Want Walkable Communities, Conservatives Prefer More Room

Would you prefer to live in a community where ...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). "Don't know" responses not shown.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Liberals and conservatives are divided over more than just politics. Those on the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum disagree about everything from the type of community in which they prefer to live to the type of people they would welcome into their families.

It is an enduring stereotype – conservatives prefer suburban McMansions while liberals like urban enclaves – but one that is grounded in reality. Given the choice, three-quarters (75%) of consistent conservatives say they would opt to live in a community where “the houses are larger and farther apart, but schools, stores and restaurants are several miles away,” and just 22% say they’d choose to live where “the houses are smaller and closer to each other, but schools, stores and restaurants are within walking distance.” The preferences of consistent liberals are almost the exact inverse, with 77% preferring the smaller house closer to amenities, and just 21% opting for more square footage farther away.

Americans overall are divided almost evenly in this preference, with 49% preferring the larger houses and 48% preferring the more convenient locations.

Liberals and conservatives don't disagree on all community preferences. For example, large majorities of both groups attach great importance to living near family and high-quality public schools.

Yet their differences are striking: liberals would rather live in cities, while conservatives prefer rural areas and small towns; liberals are more likely to say racial and ethnic diversity is important in a community; conservatives emphasize shared religious faith. And while 73% of consistent liberals say it's important to them to live near art museums and theaters, just 23% of consistent conservatives agree – one of their lowest priorities of eight community characteristics tested.


This section explores these and other key ways in which political polarization is linked to people's personal lives and day-to-day interactions. As Republicans and Democrats are growing further apart, increasingly polarized along ideological lines ([See section 1](#)) and with greater antipathy toward the opposing party ([See section 2](#)), divides in the political sphere also permeate the everyday lives of Americans.

Consistent conservatives and liberals do share one habit that distinguishes them from other Americans: They spend a lot of time talking about politics and government. This is part of a pattern of more intense political engagement among those at either end of the ideological spectrum ([See section 5](#)).

Yet conservatives and liberals also are most likely to confine political conversations to those who share their views. Fully half of consistent conservatives (50%) and 35% of consistent liberals say it is important to them to live in a place where most people share their political views – the highest shares of any of the ideological groups. If people living in “deep red” or “deep blue” America feel like they inhabit distinctly different worlds, it is in part because they seek out different types of communities, both geographic and social.

Ideological “Silos”

% who say ...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The Ideal Community: Different for Liberals than for Conservatives

When it comes to the type of community they'd like to live in, liberals are drawn toward city life while conservatives prefer small towns and rural areas. Given the choice to live anywhere in the U.S., 41% of consistent conservatives would want to live in a rural area, and an additional 35% would choose a small town. Fewer consistent conservatives (20%) would prefer living in the suburbs and just 4% want to live in a city.

In a near mirror image, 46% of consistent liberals would choose to live in a city, and 21% would choose the suburbs; far fewer would pick a rural area (11%) or a small town (20%).


The preferences of less ideological Americans are more varied. Notably, the suburbs do not have a great deal of appeal for any ideological segment. And across age, gender and other demographic categories, there is no group that expresses a clear preference for living in the suburbs.

An analysis of the data finds that where liberals and conservatives actually live reflects their community preferences, with liberals about twice as likely as conservatives to live in urban areas, while conservatives are more concentrated in rural areas.

Later reports in this Pew Research Center series will dive more deeply into how political views are related to where people live. This is a topic covered extensively by Craig Gilbert of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, in a four-part series entitled "[Dividing Lines.](#)"

Conservatives Attracted to Small Towns, Rural Areas; Liberals Prefer Cities

If you could live anywhere in the U.S., would you prefer a...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
 Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). Don't know responses not shown.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

What's Important in a Community?

Despite their differing community preferences, liberals and conservatives generally share a desire to be close to family, good schools and the outdoors. However, when it comes to the ethnic, religious or political makeup of a community, there are clear ideological divides.

Substantial majorities across all ideological groups place importance on living near extended family, though consistent liberals are a bit less likely than others to say this.


Likewise, large majorities say “high-quality public schools” are important to decisions about where to live.

Reflecting their stage of life, people age 55 and older are less likely than younger people to value good schools. To control for this lifecycle difference (and because older Americans tend to be more conservative ideologically), the analysis here is based only on those under 55.

Within this cohort, an emphasis on high-quality schools is slightly lower among conservatives than liberals. But across all ideological groups, this ranks as the top community priority of the eight items tested.

Liberals, Conservatives Agree on Importance of Living Near Family, Good Schools and the Outdoors

% saying each would be important in deciding where to live...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). “High-quality public schools” based on those under 55.


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Having access to the outdoors for hiking, camping and fishing also is a widely valued community attribute. However, there is an ideological split in the importance placed on access to another type of leisure activity: art museums and theaters. More than three times as many consistent liberals (73%) as consistent conservatives (23%) rate proximity to museums and galleries as important. There also is a wide gap among people with mostly liberal (59%) and mostly conservative (31%) views.

There are similarly deep ideological divides in the importance placed on racial and ethnic diversity and living near those who share one's religious faith. Majorities of consistent liberals (76%) and those who are mostly liberal (58%) say living somewhere with a mix of people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds would be important to them; far fewer conservatives (20% of consistent conservatives, 32% of mostly conservatives) say this. (This ideological pattern is nearly identical when the analysis is limited to non-Hispanic whites.)

Ethnic Diversity More Important for Liberals, Faith Community More Important for Conservatives

% saying each would be important in deciding where to live...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

At the same time, conservatives place more importance on living in a place where many people share their religious faith. A majority (57%) of consistent conservatives say this is important to them, compared with just 17% of consistent liberals.


Marrying Across Party Lines

While Republicans and Democrats hold increasingly negative views of the opposing party ([See section 2](#)), expressions of deep dislike on a more personal level are less common. But they do exist, and as with dislike of the opposing party, personal antipathy is most concentrated among those who hold ideologically consistent views.

Most Americans are comfortable with political diversity in their households. Just 9% of the public say they would be unhappy if an immediate family member were to marry a Republican, and about the same percentage (8%) would be unhappy about the prospect of a Democrat marrying into their immediate family. Roughly equal percentages of Democrats (15%) and Republicans (17%) say they would be unhappy welcoming someone from the other party into their family.

Some Would be Unhappy if Family Member Married ‘Outside’ of Party

How would you react if an immediate family member were to marry...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). “Doesn’t matter” includes “don’t know” responses. Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


This discomfort is most prevalent among those who are the most ideological in their thinking. Three-in-ten (30%) consistent conservatives say they’d be unhappy if a family member married a Democrat, while 23% of consistent liberals say they’d be unhappy if a Republican were to marry into the family. Yet even at the ends of the ideological spectrum, active expressions of unhappiness about marrying a Republican or a Democrat are the minority position.

Beyond the partisan affiliations of potential family members, the importance of other characteristics also differs for liberals and conservatives. Roughly half of Americans (49%) say they would be unhappy if a family member were to marry someone who doesn't believe in God.

This rises to 73% among consistent conservatives, along with 58% of those who are mostly conservative. Liberals are much less likely to be unhappy with a non-believer marrying into their families: 24% of consistent liberals and 41% of those who are mostly liberal say they would be unhappy.

Marriage to an Atheist Upsetting to Most Conservatives

How would you react if an immediate family member were to marry ...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). "Doesn't matter" includes "don't know" responses. Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding.


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Only 9% of Americans say they would be unhappy with a family member's marriage to a born-again Christian. But this sentiment triples to 27% among consistent liberals. Consistent liberals are as likely to say they'd be unhappy with a family member's marriage to a non-believer (24%) as a born-again Christian (27%).

Just 11% of Americans say they would be unhappy at the prospect of a family member marrying someone of a different race, and only 7% say the same about a marriage to someone born and raised outside of the U.S. But both of these sentiments are more common on the right than on the left.

Guess Who's Coming? Ideological Differences in Views of Family Member Marrying Different Race, Gun Owner

How would you react if an immediate family member were to marry ...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). "Doesn't matter" includes "don't know" responses. Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

About a quarter (23%) of consistent conservatives, along with 19% of those who are mostly conservative, say they'd be unhappy with a family member's marriage to someone of a different race. Most conservatives (77%) say it wouldn't matter or they would be happy about this. By comparison, just 1% of consistent liberals and 4% of those who are mostly liberal say they would be unhappy if a relative marries someone of a different race.

Reaction to a gun owner joining the family exposes a somewhat greater ideological divide. Nationwide, 19% of Americans say they would be unhappy if someone in their immediate family married a gun owner, while 17% say they would be happy (most say it wouldn't matter to them).

Most consistent liberals agree that it wouldn't matter to them, but 31% say it would make them unhappy if someone in their immediate family married a gun owner while just 5% would be happy about it. Gun ownership draws far greater enthusiasm among consistent conservatives, 49% of whom would be happy to welcome a new gun-owning family member, and just 1% would be unhappy about it. For more on gun policy views, see [section 4](#)).

While the divides over whether a prospective in-law hasn't attended college are comparatively small, liberals are somewhat likelier than conservatives to say they'd be unhappy with this (17% of consistent liberals would be unhappy, compared with 8% of consistent conservatives).


Consistent Liberals, Conservatives Talk Politics More Often

Most Americans don't talk about politics all that frequently: 58% of the public discusses government and politics a few times a month or less, while 42% discuss politics more often.

On average, Republicans talk about politics more frequently than Democrats (49% vs. 39% talk a few times a week or more), but discussions about politics are considerably more common among those with ideologically consistent views, on both the left and the right.

About seven-in-ten (69%) consistent conservatives and six-in-ten (59%) consistent liberals talk about politics a few times a week or more; that compares with just 32% of those who are ideologically mixed. And while those who are mostly liberal in their views are no more likely to talk about politics than the ideologically mixed (just 34% do so at least a few times a week), those with mostly conservative positions are (48%).

How Often Do You Discuss Government and Politics?



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
 Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). "Less often" includes those who say "A few times a month" or "Less often." Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The Ideological Echo Chamber

Not only do people who are ideologically consistent talk about politics more frequently than others, but they are also more likely to say their friends share their political views. This is particularly the case among consistent conservatives.

Just 35% of Americans say “most of my close friends share my views on government and politics,” while about as many (39%) say “some of my friends share my views, but many do not.” About a quarter (26%) say: “I don’t really know what most of my close friends think about government and politics.”

But among consistent conservatives, roughly twice as many say most of their close friends share their views as say many of their friends do not (63% vs. 30%). And among the mostly conservative, more also say their friends share their views (44% vs. 36%).


Though consistent liberals are less likely than consistent conservatives to say most of their close friends share their political views, this is still the plurality opinion among this group:

49% say most of their friends share their views, while 39% say many of their friends do not share their views. Among both those who are ideologically mixed and those who are mostly liberal, just a quarter (25%) say most of their friends share their political views.

Most Conservatives Say Close Friends Share Their Political Views

What best describes you?

- Most of my close friends share my political views
- Some of my friends share my views, many do not
- I don't know what my friends think about politics



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
 Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Dislike the Party, Avoid the People

These indicators suggest that there is a tendency on the left and the right to associate primarily with like-minded people, to the point of actively avoiding those who disagree. Not surprisingly, this tendency is also tightly entwined with the growing level of partisan antipathy. In both political parties, those with strongly negative views of the other side are more likely to be those who seek out compatible viewpoints.

Partisan Animosity in the Personal Space

Percent who say...	View of Dem Party				View of Rep Party			
	All Republicans	Very unfav	Mostly unfav	Diff	All Democrats	Very unfav	Mostly unfav	Diff
	%	%	%		%	%	%	
Most of my close friends share my political views	42	52	36	+16	33	41	29	+12
It's important to me to live in a place where most people share my political views	31	42	26	+16	27	34	22	+12
I would be unhappy if someone in my immediate family married a (Democrat/Republican)	17	29	10	+19	15	28	7	+21

Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Roughly half (52%) of Republicans with a very unfavorable view of the Democratic Party say most of their friends share their political views, compared with 36% of Republicans with less antipathy for the Democratic Party. And the same pattern exists among Democrats. The more polarized Republicans and Democrats are also substantially more likely to say they prefer living in a community where most people share their political views.

Not only do many of these polarized partisans gravitate toward like-minded people, but a significant share express a fairly strong aversion to people who disagree with them. Overall, 17% of Republicans say they would be unhappy if someone in their immediate family married a Democrat. But that aversion is three-times higher among Republicans who view the Democratic Party very negatively (29%) than among those with less negative views (10%).


Similarly, Democrats with a very unfavorable view of the Republican Party are four times as likely as those with a mostly unfavorable view to say they would be unhappy if someone in their family married a Republican (28% vs. 7%).

Polarized Views of Cable News

Public perceptions of two major news sources – MSNBC and the Fox News Channel (FNC) – are deeply divided along ideological lines. And what stands apart the most are the negative views among those on the other side of the ideological spectrum.

Notably, both of these news channels are viewed more favorably than unfavorably in the public at large, reflecting the fact that both receive generally favorable, or at least neutral, marks from people with mixed ideological views. In that regard, while consistent conservatives overwhelmingly express a positive view of the Fox News Channel (74% favorable), that is a more uniform expression of the generally favorable view found among the general public. By contrast, the strongly negative reaction to Fox News from consistent liberals – fully 73% view FNC unfavorably and just 8% favorably – stands starkly apart.

Fox News, MSNBC Stir Up Negative Views among Ideologically Consistent



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
 Notes: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A). “Neither” includes don’t know responses. Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The same pattern arises in views of MSNBC. Consistent conservatives are far-and-away the most likely to have an opinion of MSNBC, and it is overwhelmingly negative: 71% unfavorable and just 10% favorable. This stands in contrast to the positive balance of opinion from the public at large.

One thing that differs when it comes to MSNBC is that it does not draw the same uniformly positive reviews from consistent liberals that FNC does from consistent conservatives. While nearly half (45%) of consistent liberals view MSNBC favorably, that’s not much better than how

MSNBC rates among those with mixed ideological views (38%). Nearly half of consistent liberals offer no opinion of MSNBC. By contrast, the vast majority of consistent conservatives offer an opinion of Fox News, with 74% favorable and just 5% unfavorable.


The Pew Research Center will dive much more deeply into the topic of media sources and polarization in a report later this year, exploring the relationship between actual media use and political polarization.

Section 4: Political Compromise and Divisive Policy Debates

The nation’s increasing ideological polarization makes political compromise more difficult, in part because those at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum see less benefit in meeting the other side halfway.

Compromise in the Eye of the Beholder

When Barack Obama and Republican leaders differ over the most important issues facing the country, where should things end up?



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
 Notes: Question asks respondents where, on a scale of zero to 100, Obama and Republican leaders should end up when addressing the most important issues facing the country. See topline for complete question wording. Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

A logical point of compromise for most Americans is splitting things down the middle. But a significant minority – and a substantial share of the active and engaged electorate – see things differently, saying their side should get more of what it wants in political negotiations.

However, while they may be less amenable to political compromise, people on the left and the right are not necessarily more extreme in their policy views. To be sure, many Americans who have consistently liberal or conservative views support far-reaching policies on issues like gun control, abortion, health care or immigration. But in many cases they are no more likely to express these opinions than are those who hold a mixture of conservative and liberal views.

The survey includes several questions about proposals that are on the periphery of current policy debates, such as whether to launch a national effort to deport all unauthorized immigrants and whether to eliminate all restrictions on gun ownership and abortion. Sizable minorities of those who hold mixed ideological views support many of these proposals. This belies the popular conception of the center as largely made up of “moderates,” in contrast to the “extremists” on the left and right.

How We Asked About “Compromise” Between Obama, Republican Leaders

Question wording: “Thinking about how Barack Obama and Republican leaders should address the most important issues facing the country. Imagine a scale from zero to 100 where 100 means Republican leaders get everything they want and Obama gets nothing he wants, and zero means Obama gets everything and Republican leaders get nothing. Where on this scale from zero to 100 do you think they should end up?” (Note: For half of the sample, the placements of Obama and Republicans are reversed.)


Any number between 0 and 100 was accepted as a response, with responses then collapsed into 11 categories, as illustrated here. See Q26 in the [topline](#) for these categories.

'50/50' Agreements Preferred by Public

When Americans look at the political battles between President Obama and Republicans in Congress, they tend to say both sides should meet in the middle. For roughly half of Americans (49%) the preferred outcome is to split the difference at exactly 50/50 — each getting about half of what they want.

This view holds across party lines. While some Democrats would prefer to see Obama get more of what he wants in negotiations with Republicans, 46% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning say the ideal outcome is 50/50. Exactly half of Republicans and Republican-leaning agree that splitting the difference is the right end result.

Liberals, Conservatives Want Their Side to Get More of What It Wants



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Question asks respondents where, on a scale of zero to 100, Obama and Republican leaders should end up when addressing the most important issues facing the country. See topline for complete question wording. Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

But those who see the world through more ideological lenses have a very different perspective. Only about a third (34%) of consistent liberals think of the ideal point as halfway between Obama and the Republicans. Instead, most (62%) think that any deal between the two sides should be

closer to Obama's position than the GOP's position. And not by just a little bit: On average, consistent liberals say Obama should get two-thirds of what he wants, meeting congressional Republicans only one-third of the way. And 16% of consistent liberals think Obama should obtain 90% or more of what he wants in these deals.

Those on the right also are reluctant to see their side give ground. On average, consistent conservatives say that ideally, congressional Republicans should get 66% of what they want, while Obama should get just 34% of what he wants. Nearly a quarter (22%) of consistent conservatives think that Republicans should get 90% or more of what they seek.


Compromise in Principle vs. Compromise in Practice

In principle, most Americans want their political leaders to compromise. A 56% majority prefers political leaders who "are willing to compromise," while 39% prefer leaders who "stick to their positions." And this preference has a decidedly ideological tilt: Consistent liberals overwhelmingly prefer leaders who compromise (by an 82% to 14% margin), while consistent conservatives voice a preference for leaders who stick to their positions, by a 63% to 32% margin.

Despite liberals' stated preference for compromise, however, they are about as likely as conservatives to want political agreements that favor their side. Although 82% of consistent liberals prefer leaders who compromise, 62% say the optimal deal between Obama and the GOP should be closer to what Obama wants. Among consistent conservatives, there is less of a contrast: 57% say that when Republicans and Obama need to strike a deal, Republicans should get more of what they want. That's in line with the 63% majority who say they prefer leaders who stick to their positions.

Consistent Liberals Like Compromise in Principle

% who say they like elected officials who...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
 Note: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The Ideological “Center” Is Not Necessarily “Moderate”

The survey includes questions on a number of current policy proposals, relating to immigration, health care, abortion, gun control and other issues. Those on both sides of these issues were asked follow-up questions intended to test how far they would go in support of a policy position.

There is a tendency to assume that people at either end of the ideological scale are most likely to hold more extreme political views, yet this often is a flawed assumption. Many Americans may hold liberal or conservative values, yet do not consistently express very liberal or conservative opinions on issues. Conversely, being in the center of the ideological spectrum means only that a person has a mix of liberal and conservative values, not that they take moderate positions on all issues.

Measuring Support for Far-Reaching Policy Proposals

This survey includes long-standing trend questions on several issues, including gun control, abortion, health care, immigration and entitlements. These measures capture attitudes about current debates, such as whether it is more important to control gun ownership or protect gun rights.

But we also tested opinions about proposals that are not a focus of today’s political discussions. In the case of guns: how many Americans want to eliminate all restrictions on owning guns? Or alternatively, how many would support limiting gun ownership just to law enforcement personnel?

These are not ideas that typically draw support from political leaders on the left or right. Yet opinions about far-reaching proposals are revealing. Nearly a quarter of Americans take an all-or-nothing approach to gun ownership: 11% favor no limits on gun ownership; 12% believe no one except law enforcement personnel should be able to own guns.

The goal of this research is to determine the relationship between ideological consistency and opinions that, in the current political context, may seem extreme. In some cases, as with views on gun ownership, consistent conservatives are most likely to express such opinions; in others, such as in views on abortion and health care, liberals stand out. Yet on each issue tested, sizable minorities of those with mixed ideologically views express either extremely conservative or liberal opinions. The questions used for this analysis can be found in the survey topline.


Gun Control

Take gun control as an example. In this survey, we update our long-standing trend on whether it is more important to protect gun rights or control gun ownership. Overall, 49% prioritize gun rights and 48% say it is more important to control gun ownership; these views are little changed [from a year ago](#).

And to capture more detail on how far people are willing to go on this issue, each of these groups was asked a follow-up question. Those who favor gun rights were asked if there should be some restrictions – or no restrictions – on gun ownership. Those who prioritize gun control were asked if most people should be allowed to own guns within limits, or if only law enforcement personnel should be allowed to own guns. Overall, most Americans expressed what might be considered a “moderate” view: They either prioritize gun rights but with some limits, or they prioritize gun control but support gun ownership with some limits. Smaller numbers take more unyielding positions: 11% support no restrictions on gun ownership, while about as many (12%) favor, in effect, a ban on personal gun ownership.

Conservatives Most Likely to Support No Limits on Gun Ownership

Is it more important to ...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: “Don’t know” responses not shown. Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A)

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Opinions on the threshold gun control question are deeply divided along ideological lines: 96% of consistent conservatives say it is more important to protect gun rights, while 81% of consistent liberals say it is more important to control gun ownership.

Compared with this near-unanimity on general priorities, all-or-nothing proposals on guns attract relatively modest support from the right and left. Consistent conservatives are most likely to favor complete freedom to own guns. Still, that is the minority view: 60% favor gun rights but with some limits on gun ownership, while 34% say there should be no limits at all.

And on the other side, just 16% of consistent liberals say that only law enforcement officials should have guns; 64% say they support gun control but that most people should still be able to own guns, within limits.

Notably, about one-in-five (22%) of those with ideologically mixed views supports one of these positions. Their views are divided: 13% favor a virtual ban on people owning guns, while 9% would place no limits on gun ownership. Thus, those in the center ideologically are no less likely than those on the left, and only somewhat less likely than those on the right, to hold all-or-nothing views about gun ownership.


Immigration: Beyond Path to Citizenship

The congressional debate on immigration reform has centered on whether a “path to citizenship” for unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. should be included in legislation. Public opinion on this issue is lopsided, with 76% saying immigrants in the U.S. illegally should be eligible for citizenship if they meet certain requirements, while just 23% are opposed.

Yet the issue remains contentious, at least in part because opposition goes significantly beyond the view that unauthorized immigrants should simply be denied an opportunity to become citizens. Most of those who oppose a path to citizenship – 17% out of the 23% – say there should be a national law enforcement effort to deport all immigrants who are living in the U.S. illegally.

Most Who Oppose Path to Citizenship Favor Deporting All Here Illegally

Immigrants now living in the U.S. illegally should ...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: “Don’t know” responses not shown. Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A)

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Support for deportation of all unauthorized immigrants is relatively high among consistent conservatives, 41% of whom take this position. But it draws support elsewhere as well: 28% of mostly conservative Americans take this view, as do 19% of those who show neither a conservative nor a liberal leaning.

On the other side of the issue, those who back a path to citizenship were asked if unauthorized immigrants who meet certain conditions should be eligible for citizenship right away or only after a period of time. Most Americans (54%) think eligibility should come only after a period of time, while a much smaller share (20%) believes that unauthorized immigrants who meet the requirements should be eligible for citizenship right away.

As with views of deportation, opinions about immediate eligibility are strongly associated with ideology; 45% of consistent liberals favor immediate citizenship. But many others hold this view too, including 18% of those who have virtually no ideological predisposition, and 7% of consistent conservatives.

All told, 37% of non-ideological Americans support drastic changes in America's immigration policies: 19% favor deportation of all unauthorized immigrants and 18% support immediate citizenship if conditions are met. That's only slightly lower than the share of consistent liberals and consistent conservatives who favor such major changes (46% and 47%, respectively).


Most Favor Middle Ground on Abortion

Abortion remains one of the most divisive issues in American politics: The current survey finds 51% saying it should be legal in all or most cases, while 43% say it should be illegal in all or most cases, a balance of opinion little changed over the past decade or more.

Yet abortion also is an issue on which the public generally supports a middle-ground approach. Most of those who support legal abortion say there should be some restrictions on abortion (31% of the public answers this way); just 19% say there should be no restrictions at all on abortion. Similarly, among abortion opponents, twice as many say abortion should be allowed “in some situations” as say it should “never be allowed” (28% of the public vs. 14%).

Liberals Most Likely to Favor No Restrictions on Abortion

Abortion should be ...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: “Don’t know” responses not shown. Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A)

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Consistent liberals are far more likely than other groups to say there should be no restrictions on abortion. In fact, those who favor legal abortion (88%) are evenly divided (44%-43%) over whether there are some situations in which abortion should be restricted or there should be no restrictions on abortion.

By comparison, only about one-in-five (21%) consistent conservatives support a total ban on abortions. In part, this reflects the fact that conservatives are less likely to oppose legal abortion than liberals are to support it (73% vs. 88%). Yet even among consistent conservatives who oppose abortion, most say it should be allowed in some situations; 51% of consistent conservatives oppose abortion, but say it should be allowed in some circumstances, more than double the share who thinks it should never be permitted.


While opinions about abortion are correlated with ideology, many Americans who are not ideologically aligned still express unyielding views on this issue. Among those who hold a mixture of liberal and conservative opinions, 31% see the issue in black-or-white terms (14% say it should never be allowed, 16% say it should face no restrictions at all).

Conflicted Views of NSA Surveillance

The government’s anti-surveillance program is an unusual issue in that it divides members of both parties. The current survey finds that 54% of Americans disapprove of the government’s collection of telephone and internet data as part of anti-terrorism efforts, while 41% approve. But most of those who disapprove (38% of all Americans) say the National Security Agency should be allowed to collect some limited information. Similarly, most who approve of the program (26% of all Americans) think there should still be some limits on what the NSA collects.

On NSA, 30% Either Want No Limits on Surveillance or Say ‘Shut It Down’

Opinion about gov't data collection of telephone and internet data as part of anti-terrorism efforts...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
 Notes: “Don’t know” responses not shown. Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A)

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Still, a minority of Americans – 30% overall – view the surveillance issue in essentially all-or-nothing terms. Fifteen percent not only approve of the program, but say “the NSA should be allowed to collect whatever data it needs.” And an identical 15% take the opposite view, not only disapproving of the program, but saying “the NSA should be prevented from collecting any data about U.S. citizens.”

Three-quarters of consistent conservatives (75%), as well as 53% of consistent liberals, disapprove of the government’s surveillance program. Yet conservatives and liberals are not any more likely than others to view the issue of government surveillance in stark terms. Among consistent liberals, as many say the NSA program should be prevented from collecting any data about U.S. citizens as say it should be able to collect whatever it feels it needs (12% and 13%, respectively.) Nearly a quarter (24%) of consistent conservatives want to shut down the program, while 7% say it should be unfettered.

And these views aren’t limited to the ideologically oriented. Those with mixed ideological views are about as likely to have a relatively sweeping preference about government surveillance: 16% say, in effect, there should be no limits on the NSA’s data-collection program; 14% think it should not be able to collect any data on U.S. citizens.


Government's Role in Health Care

The idea of a single-payer health care system – in which the government pays for all health care costs – has long been a dream of many liberals. But when Congress took up health care reform in 2009, Democrats united behind a market-based proposal – what became the Affordable Care Act – which was seen as more politically feasible.

The current survey finds that government involvement in the health care system continues to draw extensive liberal support: Fully 89% of consistent liberals say it is the responsibility of the federal government to make sure all Americans have health care coverage. And roughly half – 54% – think health insurance “should be provided through a single national health insurance system run by the government.”

Few Conservatives Favor No Government Involvement in Health Care

Is it the federal government's responsibility to make sure all Americans have health care coverage?



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: “Don’t know” responses not shown. Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A)

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Overall, the public is divided over how far the government should go in providing health care. About half (47%) say the government has a responsibility to make sure all Americans have health care coverage, while 50% say that is not the responsibility of the federal government.

Those who believe the government does have a responsibility to ensure health coverage were asked if health insurance should be provided through a mix of private insurance companies and the government, or if the government alone should provide insurance. The single-payer option was supported by 21%, while about as many (23%) favor a mix of public and private insurance.

On the other side of the issue, while half say it isn't the government's responsibility to make sure all have health care coverage, relatively few want the government to get out of the health care system entirely. Rather, 43% say it's not the government's responsibility to ensure health care coverage for all, but believe the government should "continue programs like Medicare and Medicaid for seniors and the very poor." Only 6% of Americans go so far as to say the government "should not be involved in providing health insurance at all."

Even among consistent conservatives, there is minimal support for the government having absolutely no role in providing health care. Three-quarters of consistent conservatives (75%) say the government should continue Medicare and Medicaid while just 20% think the government should not be involved in providing health insurance.

Social Security: Wide Opposition to Benefit Cuts

The public, [particularly younger Americans](#), are deeply skeptical about their chances for ever receiving full Social Security benefits when they retire. Among the overall public, just 14% expect that Social Security will have sufficient resources to provide the current level of benefits; 39% say there will be enough money to provide reduced benefits and 43% think that, when they retire, the program will be unable to provide any benefits.


Despite the bleak public perceptions about the future of Social Security, most Americans (67%) say that benefits cuts should not be an option when thinking about Social Security's long-term future. Just 31% say some reductions for future retirees need to be considered.

When the majority who oppose benefits cuts is asked if the program should be expanded, or kept as it is, most support the status quo. Nearly four-in-ten Americans (37%) say benefits should remain as they are, yet roughly a quarter (27%) favor Social Security covering "more people with greater benefits."

Among those who say benefits reductions should be considered, very few (just 6% of the public overall) think Social Security should be phased out as a government program. Far more (24% of the public) think benefits should be maintained but at a reduced level.

Little Support for Phasing out Social Security

Thinking about the long term future of Social Security ...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: "Don't know" responses not shown. Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A)

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

There is substantial agreement across the ideological spectrum on the question of whether benefit reductions should be considered: Majorities in every group, including 59% of consistent conservatives, say they should not. Support for expanded benefits is nearly as high among those with mixed ideological views (29% favor) as it is among consistent liberals (31%).

The prospect of phasing out Social Security draws little support. No more than about one-in-ten in any group favors phasing out Social Security as a government program.

Section 5: Political Engagement and Activism


The ‘U-Shape’ of Political Activism; Higher at Ideological Extremes, Lower in Center



Percent who **always vote**



Percent who contributed to a **political candidate or group** in the past two years



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Bars represent the level of participation at each point on a 10 question scale of ideological consistency. Figures are reported on the five ideological consistency groups used throughout the report (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Political engagement can take on many different forms, including voting, contributing money to a candidate or political group, working or volunteering for a campaign, attending a campaign event or contacting an elected official. But on every measure of engagement, political participation is strongly related to ideology and partisan antipathy; those who hold consistently liberal or conservative views, and who hold strongly negative views of the other political party, are far more likely to participate in the political process than the rest of the nation.

This results in a consistent “U-shaped” pattern, with higher levels of engagement on the right and left of the ideological spectrum, and lower levels in the center. But the shape of the curve varies across different types of participation. For example, when it comes to voting, the peak is much higher on the right than on the left: 78% of those who are consistently conservative say they always vote, compared with 58% of consistent liberals. But on both sides, the propensity to vote falls among those whose ideological views are more mixed. At the center, just 39% of those who hold a mix of liberal and conservative values describe themselves as regular voters. That is half the rate of consistent conservatives.

When it comes to who makes political donations, these disparities are even more pronounced. Nationwide, 15% of adults report having made a donation to a candidate running for public office or to a group working to elect a candidate in the last two years. But donation rates are roughly double the national average among ideologically consistent liberals (31% have donated money) and conservatives (26%). Just 8% of those with mixed ideological views have donated to a candidate or campaign in the past two years.


The fact that the peak donation rate is slightly higher on the left than on the right might be surprising, but this includes more small donations from liberals than conservatives. Just 4% of Americans say their contributions in the past two years have added up to \$250 or more, including a roughly equal number of consistent liberals (7%) and consistent conservatives (8%).

Regardless of the amount, there is an ideological skew in campaign donations: Put together, people on the ideological right and left are considerably more likely than those who are ideologically mixed to have made a campaign donation in the past two years (29% vs. 8%) or to have donated \$250 or more (7% vs. 2%).

This pattern is also evident across other types of political engagement, including contacting an elected official, attending a campaign event, and working or volunteering for a candidate or campaign. In each instance, people at the ideological left and right are more than twice as likely to be active participants in the political process compared with those who hold a roughly equal mix of liberal and conservative values.

Political Activism on the Left and the Right

In the past two years, percent who have ...



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Bars represent the level of participation at each point on a 10 question scale of ideological consistency. Figures are reported on the five ideological consistency groups used throughout the report (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


To be sure, there are many factors that correlate strongly with voting, engagement and political activism: Age, education and income are among the most prominent. Yet even after controlling for these and other demographic factors known to be associated with higher levels of participation, the relationship between ideological consistency and engagement persists.

Partisan Antipathy and Political Engagement

The current political landscape is marked not just by increased ideological uniformity ([See section 1](#)), but also by growing political animosity, as partisans see the other side in starkly negative terms ([See section 2](#)). Today, nearly all Democrats and Republicans – including those who only lean toward one or the other political party – view the other party unfavorably, with a steep increase in the share with *very* unfavorable views.

Partisan Animosity and Political Participation

Measures of political participation, by views of the other party



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Notes: Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B). Those who have a favorable view of the other party not shown.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Holding a strongly negative view of one's political adversaries is also a substantial factor driving political engagement. Among both Republicans and Democrats, those who see the other side in very unfavorable terms are significantly more likely to be regular voters, to make campaign donations, and to participate in the political process in other ways.

For example, among Republicans, 68% of those who have a very negative view of the Democratic Party say they always vote, compared with only half of those with a mostly negative opinion. Republicans who strongly dislike the Democratic Party are much more likely to have made a political donation in the past two years (23% vs. 12%), to have contacted an elected official (42% vs. 30%), or to have volunteered or worked for a campaign (9% vs. 5%).

The same pattern holds among Democrats, though to a slightly lesser extent; 58% of Democrats who have a very unfavorable view of the Republican Party say they always vote, compared with 46% of those who have a mostly unfavorable view. And Democrats who strongly dislike the Republican Party are more likely to have made a political donation in the past two years (22% vs. 14%) to have attended a campaign event (20% vs. 14%) and to have volunteered or worked for a campaign (12% vs. 8%).

Polarization and the Primaries


All of these patterns hold when it comes to participating in party primaries as well. About four-in-ten (43%) Republicans who have a very unfavorable view of the Democratic Party say they always vote in primaries, compared with 27% of those with less negative views. The same is true on the Democratic side; those with deeply negative views are 12 points more likely to say they always participate in the primaries (33% vs. 21%).

Similarly, most consistent conservatives (54%) say they always vote in primaries, higher than the 34% of consistent liberals who say the same. But both of these groups are far more likely to vote than are people with a roughly even mix of liberal and conservative views, just 18% of whom say they always vote in primaries.

Ideological Consistency and Primary Voting



Percent who always vote in primaries



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public
 Note: Bars represent the level of participation at each point on a 10 question scale of ideological consistency. Figures are reported on the five ideological consistency groups used throughout the report (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Ideology and Antipathy Add Up

To be sure, those who are ideologically consistent – on both ends of the spectrum – tend to have a deeper dislike of the opposing party than those who are less ideological. But even after controlling for ideology, antipathy toward the other party remains a strong predictor of participation in political activities. And those who are both ideologically consistent and have a very negative view of the other party are even more likely to be engaged. Fully 83% of Republicans in this category say they always vote, compared with 70% of consistently conservative Republicans who say they have a mostly unfavorable view of the Democratic Party. Democrats who are consistently liberal and have a very negative opinion of the Republican Party are 19 percentage points more likely to say they always vote than consistently liberal Democrats who have a less negative view of the GOP.

Voting Rates Highest Among the Most Polarized

Cell entries show the percent of partisans in each quadrant who say they always vote

Among Democrats:				Among Republicans:			
Ideology	View of the Republican Party		Total	View of the Democratic Party		Total	
	Very unfav	Mostly unfav		Very unfav	Mostly unfav		
Consistently liberal	70	51	60	Consistently conservative	83	70	79
Mostly liberal	55	46	47	Mostly conservative	69	56	62
Mixed	49	41	41	Mixed	48	41	42
Total	58	46	49	Total	68	50	56

Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Republicans include Republican-leaning independents; Democrats include Democratic-leaning independents (see Appendix B). Groups too small to analyze (e.g. Republicans who have a favorable view of the Democratic party and conservative Democrats) are included in totals, but not shown in individual cells.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

More Politically Engaged, But Not a Majority


Because political participation and activism are so much higher among the more ideologically polarized elements of the population, these voices are over-represented in the political process. Even so, they do not make up the majority of voters, donors or campaign activists.

Nationwide, 21% are either consistently liberal or consistently conservative in their political values. But these people make up a larger share of the electorate – 28% of people who say they always vote and 34% of those who always vote in primaries.

This pattern is even stronger at higher levels of activism. Consistent liberals and conservatives make up 41% of the people who have made a campaign donation over the past two years – double their presence in the public at large.

Despite Higher Engagement, Ideological Left & Right a Minority of Voters, Activists

Ideological composition of the public, as well as key groups within the electorate



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public

Note: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Yet even here, those with ideological viewpoints are not the only participants in the process, as most campaign donors express mixed views or only mostly liberal or conservative views.

In short, while the left and the right may speak louder in the political process, they do not necessarily drown out other elements of the public entirely. And this may be one reason why, even in lower-turnout primaries, the more ideological candidates do not always carry the day.

For Further Reading

This study draws upon a rich set of existing research on the topics of political polarization and ideological consistency in the American public, from both academics and political journalists. The books and articles listed below (by no means a comprehensive list) address many of the aspects of polarization discussed in this report and may be a good starting point for those looking to dive deeper into the topic.

In addition, The Washington Post’s [Monkey Cage](#) blog series about political polarization, which ran earlier this year, is a useful primer on the topic. It includes entries from several of the authors below, as well as many other scholars on the topic. See the bottom of [the last piece in the series](#) for links to the full list of entries.

Some Further Reading

Abramowitz, Alan I. 2013. *The Polarized Public?: Why American Government Is So Dysfunctional*.

Bishop, Bill. 2008. *The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart*.

Broockman, David. 2014. “[Approaches to Studying Representation](#)” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley.

Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope. 2011. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*. Third edition.

Gilbert, Craig. 2014. “[Dividing Lines](#).” *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*.

Hetherington, Marc J. 2009. “Review Article: Putting Polarization in Perspective.” *British Journal of Political Science*.

Iyengar, Shanto, Gaurav Sood and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. “[Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization](#).” *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady (eds.). 2006. *Red and Blue Nation?: Characteristics and Causes of America's Polarized Politics*. Washington, DC: Brookings.

Prior, Markus. 2013. “[Media and Political Polarization](#).” *Annual Review of Political Science*.

Appendix A: The Ideological Consistency Scale

Throughout this report we utilize a scale composed of 10 questions asked on Pew Research Center surveys going back to 1994 to gauge the extent to which people offer mostly liberal or mostly conservative views across a range of political value dimensions. In short, while there is no ex-ante reason for people’s views on diverse issues such as the social safety net, homosexuality and military strength to correlate, these views have a traditional “left/right” association, and the scale measures this growing correlation over time.

Items in the Ideological Consistency Scale

Question #	Conservative Position	[OR]	Liberal Position
Q25a	Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient		Government often does a better job than people give it credit for
Q25b	Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good		Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest
Q25c	Poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing anything in return		Poor people have hard lives because government benefits don't go far enough to help them live decently
Q25d	The government today can't afford to do much more to help the needy		The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means going deeper into debt
Q25f	Blacks who can't get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own condition		Racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can't get ahead these days
Q25g	Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care		Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents
Q25i	The best way to ensure peace is through military strength		Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace
Q25n	Most corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit		Business corporations make too much profit
Q50r	Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy		Stricter environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost
Q50u	Homosexuality should be discouraged by society		Homosexuality should be accepted by society

Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The individual questions in the scale are shown here. The [topline](#) shows the long term trends on these items, and [section 1](#) of the report tracks the partisan divides on each question since 1994.

Individual questions were recoded as follows: “-1” for a liberal response, “+1” for a conservative response, “0” for other (don’t know/refused/volunteered) responses. As a result, scores on the full scale range from -10 (liberal responses to all 10 questions) to +10 (conservative responses to all 10 questions). For analytical purposes, respondents are grouped into one of five categories, which are used throughout the report, as follows:

- Consistently conservative (+7 to +10)
- Mostly conservative (+3 to +6)
- Mixed (-2 to +2)
- Mostly liberal (-6 to -3)
- Consistently liberal (-10 to -7)

To put these figures in perspective, a respondent offering five liberal and five conservative views, or six of one and four of the other, would be considered as having “mixed” ideological views. Someone offering seven conservative and three liberal responses, or eight and two, would be considered “mostly conservative.” And any respondents offering nine conservative and one liberal response, or all ten conservative, would be considered “consistently conservative.” Since some people do not answer every question, other combinations are possible.

Distribution of the Ideological Consistency Scale

<i>% who are...</i>	1994	1999	2004	2011	2014
Consistently conservative	7	4	3	7	9
Mostly conservative	23	16	15	19	18
Mixed	49	49	49	42	39
Mostly liberal	18	25	25	23	22
Consistently liberal	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>12</u>
	100	100	100	100	100
Central tendency					
Mean	.6	-.6	-.9	-.3	-.6
Median	0	0	-1	0	0
Cronbach’s alpha	.50	.51	.53	.66	.72
N	3,800	3,973	2,000	3,029	10,014

Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public.

Note: Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of the overall inter-item correlation across the 10 questions.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The graphics in [section 1 \(ideological consistency\)](#) and [section 2 \(engagement\)](#) use the full set of points on the scale (note that graphics in section 1 are smoothed by showing the average of two consecutive points on the scale).

Any ideological index has its limitations because defining what it means to be liberal and conservative is inherently controversial. [As we have illustrated elsewhere](#), American political thinking is multidimensional, and any effort to “flatten” ideology to a single left/right dimension may miss this rich texture.

But our purpose here is to study the concept of ideological “consistency” – or the share of Americans who hold liberal or conservative views across a range of values dimensions; this is also sometimes referred to as “ideological constraint” or “ideological sorting” by political scientists and other researchers.

Because the focus is on change over time, we are limited to a set of questions that were invented 20 years ago, and this creates imperfections. For example, the elements of the index do not cover more recent value divides, such as surveillance or terrorism.

In addition, while the range of the scale (from -10, all liberal responses, to +10, all conservative responses) remains the same throughout the period of study, the “center” of the American public does shift. For instance, in 2014 the mean on the scale is -0.6, slightly to the left; in 1994 the mean score was slightly to the right (+0.6). To a large extent, this shift reflects an overall societal shift to the left on two issues: homosexuality and immigration.


This overall shift does not necessarily mean that the average American is more liberal than conservative because the mean is now less than zero. But it does mean that people on the liberal end of the scale are now somewhat closer to the center of the scale than are those at the conservative end. As a result, the relative sizes of the “consistently liberal” and “consistently conservative” groups are not strictly comparable. That is, because of the scale’s construction, we would not definitively conclude that there are more consistent liberals (12%) than consistent conservatives (9%) today. Yet the changes over time—e.g., the overall increase in the proportion who are consistently liberal or conservative—and the differences in attitudes and behaviors across groups, are robust even when alternative definitions that account for the scaling differences are used.

Appendix B: Why We Include Leaners With Partisans

Throughout this report, the analysis of partisan attitudes combines both those who identify with and those who lean toward the parties. In many respects, those who lean toward the parties—even if they identify as independent—have attitudes and behaviors that are very similar to those of partisans. That most leaners are “closet partisans” has been observed by many political scientists (see [here](#) and [here](#) for a few recent examples of this discussion). And we have remarked on this in prior Pew Research Center studies, including in our 2012 Values poll—see the end of [section one of the Values report](#) for a discussion.

And this pattern is again evident when it comes to the two dimensions of polarization discussed in this report: ideological consistency and partisan acrimony.

Ideological Consistency: Leaners Look Much Like Partisans



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public.

Note: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (See Appendix A).


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

On the first, discussed [in section 1](#), leaners' ideological positions largely overlap those of partisans. And as Republicans have become more conservative, and Democrats more liberal, leaners have moved along with them.


Over the last two decades, Republican leaners have been, on average, just slightly less conservative than Republicans overall. For instance, today, 57% of Republican identifiers and 47% of Republican leaners are consistently or mostly conservative. By contrast, just 5% of Democratic leaners are mostly or consistently conservative (see [Appendix A](#) for a discussion of the ideological consistency scale).

Ideological Consistency: Leaners More Similar to Partisans Than Other Independents

% consistently or mostly conservative



% consistently or mostly liberal



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public.
 Note: Ideological consistency based on a scale of 10 political values questions (see Appendix A).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


The positions of those who identify as Democrats and those who lean toward the Democratic Party are nearly identical over this time period: 57% of Democrats and 54% of Democratic leaners are consistently or mostly liberal today. When the two groups did diverge in 2004, Democratic leaners were somewhat *more* likely than Democrats to be to the left of center.

And the dislike of the opposing party discussed in [section 2](#) is almost as acute among leaners as partisans. Today, nearly as many Republican leaners (40%) as Republicans (46%) express very unfavorable opinions of the Democratic Party, and the steep growth in deeply negative views is seen in both groups.


On the left, Democratic leaners are somewhat less likely than Democratic identifiers to hold strongly negative views of Republicans (42% of Democrats and 30% of Democratic leaners have a very unfavorable opinion of the GOP). Still, the overall growth in antipathy is just as pronounced among leaners as among Democrats.

Partisan Antipathy: Leaners Look Much Like Partisans

% with very unfavorable view of Republican Party



% with very unfavorable view of Democratic Party



Source: 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Overall, it would have been possible to combine these two groups of “leaners” into a single “independent” category to contrast with Republicans and Democrats (that line is plotted in the middle of the above graphics). But combining these two dramatically different groups would be misleading; these are two groups that have little in common with each other, and far more in common with self-identified partisans.

About the Surveys

The data in this report are based on two independent survey administrations with the same randomly selected, nationally representative group of respondents. The first is the center's largest survey on domestic politics to date: the 2014 Political Polarization and Typology Survey, a telephone survey of just over 10,000 Americans. The second involved impaneling a subset of these respondents into the newly created American Trends Panel and following up with them via a survey conducted by web and telephone. The two surveys are described separately, in further detail, in the section that follows.

Overview of Telephone Survey Methodology

Most of the analysis in this report is based on telephone interviews conducted January 23-March 16, 2014 among a randomly selected national sample of 10,013 adults, 18 years of age or older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia (5010 respondents were interviewed on a landline, and 5003 were interviewed on a cellphone, including 2,649 who had no landline telephone). The survey was conducted under the direction of Abt SRBI. A combination of landline and cellphone random digit dial samples were used; both samples were provided by Survey Sampling International. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish. Respondents in the landline sample were selected by randomly asking for the youngest adult male or female who was at home at the time of the call. Interviews in the cell sample were conducted with the person who answered the phone, if that person was an adult 18 years of age or older. For detailed information about our survey methodology, see <http://people-press.org/methodology/>.

Data collection was divided equally into three phases (A, B, and C) with independent samples, non-overlapping interview dates and separate weighting. The questionnaire for each phase contained a core set of measures of political attitudes and values, political engagement and demographic characteristics, along with a set of unique questions about issues, lifestyle, media use and other topics covered in this series of reports. Additionally, most respondents to the survey were invited to join the newly created Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel, described below.

The combined landline and cellphone sample is weighted using an iterative technique that matches gender, age, education, race, Hispanic origin and nativity and region to parameters from the 2012 Census Bureau's American Community Survey and population density to parameters from the 2010 U.S. Census. The sample also is weighted to match current patterns of telephone status (landline only, cellphone only, or both landline and cellphone), based on extrapolations from the 2013 National Health Interview Survey. The weighting procedure accounts for the fact that respondents with both landline and cellphones have a greater probability of being included in

the combined sample and adjusts for household size among respondents with a landline phone. Sampling errors and statistical tests of significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey:

Group	Total sample for all three phases		Single phase	
	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	10,013	1.1 percentage points	3,335	2.0 percentage points
Republican/lean Republican	4,177	1.7 percentage points	1,340	3.1 percentage points
Very unfav view of Dem party	1,903	2.6 percentage points	604	4.6 percentage points
Mostly unfav view of Dem party	1,607	2.8 percentage points	514	5.0 percentage points
Democrat/lean Democrat	4,657	1.7 percentage points	1,517	2.9 percentage points
Very unfav view of Rep party	1,913	2.6 percentage points	589	4.7 percentage points
Mostly unfav view of Rep party	1,901	2.6 percentage points	612	4.6 percentage points
Consistently conservative	1,078	3.4 percentage points	347	6.1 percentage points
Mostly conservative	1,932	2.6 percentage points	625	4.5 percentage points
Mixed	3,469	1.9 percentage points	1,127	3.4 percentage points
Mostly liberal	2,066	2.5 percentage points	659	4.4 percentage points
Consistently liberal	1,468	3.0 percentage points	485	5.1 percentage points

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request.

In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Telephone Survey Methodology in Detail

Sample Design

A combination of landline and cellphone random digit dial samples were used; both samples were provided by Survey Sampling International. Landline and cellphone numbers were sampled to yield an equal number of landline and cellphone interviews.

The design of the landline sample ensures representation of both listed and unlisted numbers (including those not yet listed) by using random digit dialing. This method uses random generation of the last two digits of telephone numbers selected on the basis of the area code, telephone exchange and bank number. A bank is defined as 100 contiguous telephone numbers, for example 800-555-1200 to 800-555-1299. The telephone exchanges are selected to be proportionally stratified by county and by telephone exchange within the county. That is, the number of telephone numbers randomly sampled from within a given county is proportional to that county's share of telephone numbers in the U.S. Only banks of telephone numbers containing one or more listed residential numbers are selected.

The cellphone sample is drawn through systematic sampling from dedicated wireless banks of 1,000 contiguous numbers and shared service banks with no directory-listed landline numbers (to ensure that the cellphone sample does not include banks that are also included in the landline sample). The sample is designed to be representative, both geographically and by large and small wireless carriers.

Both the landline and cell samples are released for interviewing in replicates, which are small random samples of each larger sample. Using replicates to control the release of telephone numbers ensures that the complete call procedures are followed for all numbers dialed. The use of replicates also improves the overall representativeness of the survey by helping to ensure that the regional distribution of numbers called is appropriate.

Respondent Selection

Respondents in the landline sample were selected by randomly asking for the youngest male or female, 18 years of age or older who was at home at the time of the call (for half of the households interviewers ask to speak with the youngest male first, and for the other half the youngest female). If there is no eligible person of the requested gender at home, interviewers ask to speak with the youngest adult of the opposite gender now at home. This method of selecting respondents within households improves participation among young people, who are often more difficult to interview

than older people because of their lifestyles, but this method is not a random sampling of members of the household.

Unlike a landline phone, a cellphone is assumed in Pew Research polls to be a personal device. Interviewers ask if the person who answers the cellphone is 18 years of age or older to determine if the person is eligible to complete the survey; interviewers also confirm that the person is not driving and is in a safe place. For those in the cell sample, no effort is made to give other household members a chance to be interviewed. Although some people share cellphones, it is still uncertain whether the benefits of sampling among the users of a shared cellphone outweigh the disadvantages.

Interviewing

Interviewing was conducted under the direction of Abt SRBI. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish. Data collection was divided equally into three phases (A, B and C) with independent samples, non-overlapping interview dates and separate weighting. The questionnaire for each phase contained a core set of measures of political attitudes and values, political engagement and demographic characteristics, along with a set of unique questions about issues, lifestyle, media use and other topics covered in this series of reports.

As many as seven attempts were made to complete an interview at every sampled landline and cellphone number. Calls were staggered over times of day and days of the week (including at least one daytime call) to maximize the chances of making contact with a potential respondent. An effort was made to recontact most interview breakoffs or refusals to attempt to convert them to completed interviews. People reached on cellphones were offered \$5 compensation for the minutes used to complete the survey. Additionally, most respondents to the survey were invited to join the newly created Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel (see below).

Overall, the response rate was 11.2% for the landline sample and 9.8% for the cell sample. The response rate is the percentage of known or assumed residential households for which a completed interview was obtained, and is computed using the American Association for Public Opinion Research's method for Response Rate 3 (RR3) as outlined in their [Standard Definitions](#).

Weighting

The landline sample is first weighted by household size to account for the fact that people in larger households have a lower probability of being selected. In addition, the combined landline and cellphone sample is weighted to adjust for the overlap of the landline and cell frames (since people

with both a landline and cellphone have a greater probability of being included in the sample), including the relative size of each frame and each sample.

The sample is then weighted to population parameters using an iterative technique that matches gender, age, education, race, Hispanic origin and nativity, region, population density and telephone usage. The population parameters for gender, age, education, race/ethnicity and region are from the Census Bureau's 2012 American Community Survey (ACS) one-year estimates, and the parameter for population density is from the 2010 U.S. Census. The parameter for telephone usage (landline only, cellphone only, both landline and cellphone) is based on extrapolations from the 2013 National Health Interview Survey. The specific weighting parameters are: gender by age, gender by education, age by education, race/ethnicity (including Hispanic origin and nativity), region, density and telephone usage; non-Hispanic whites are also balanced on age, education and region. The weighting procedure simultaneously balances the distributions of all weighting parameters. The final weights are trimmed to prevent individual cases from having a disproportionate influence on the final results.

Weighting cannot eliminate every source of nonresponse bias. Nonetheless, properly-conducted public opinion polls have a good record of obtaining unbiased samples.

Sampling Error

Sampling error results from collecting data from some, rather than all, members of the population. The 2014 Political Polarization and Typology Survey of 10,013 adults had a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 1.1 percentage points with a 95% confidence interval. This means that in 95 out of every 100 samples of the same size and type, the results we obtain would vary by no more than plus or minus 1.1 percentage points from the result we would get if we could interview every member of the population. Thus, the chances are very high (95 out of 100) that any sample we draw will be within 1.1 points of the true population value. The margins of error reported and statistical tests of significance are adjusted to account for the survey's design effect, a measure of how much efficiency is lost from the weighting procedures.

Many of the findings in this report are based on parts of the sample, such as the interviews in a single phase of the study (approximate sample size 3,333) or on subgroups such as Democrats or women. The sampling error for these will be larger than for the total sample. Sampling error for frequently-cited subgroups and for the individual phases are reported above.

The American Trends Panel Survey

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by the Pew Research Center and first introduced in this report, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults living in households. Respondents who self-identify as internet users (representing 89% of U.S. adults) participate in the panel via monthly self-administered Web surveys, and those who do not use the internet participate via telephone or mail. The panel is being managed by Abt SRBI.

Data in this report are drawn from the first wave of the panel, conducted March 19–April 29, 2014 among 3,308 respondents (2,901 by Web and 407 by phone). The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,308 respondents is plus or minus 2.2 percentage points.

All current members of the American Trends Panel were originally recruited from the 2014 Political Polarization and Typology Survey, a large (n=10,013) national landline and cellphone random digit dial (RDD) survey conducted January 23rd to March 16th, 2014, in English and Spanish. At the end of that survey, respondents were invited to join the panel. The invitation was extended to all respondents who use the internet (from any location) and a random subsample of respondents who do not use the internet.¹

Of the 10,013 adults interviewed, 9,809 were invited to take part in the panel. A total of 5,338 agreed to participate and provided either a mailing address or an email address to which a welcome packet, a monetary incentive and future survey invitations could be sent. Panelists also receive a small monetary incentive after participating in each wave of the survey.

The ATP data were weighted in a multi-step process that begins with a base weight incorporating the respondents' original survey selection probability and the fact that some panelists were subsampled for invitation to the panel. Next, an adjustment was made for the fact that the propensity to join the panel varied across different groups in the sample. The final step in the weighting uses an iterative technique that matches gender, age, education, race, Hispanic origin, telephone service, population density and region to parameters from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2012 American Community Survey. It also adjusts for party affiliation using an average of the three most recent Pew Research Center general public telephone surveys, and for internet use using as a parameter a measure from the 2014 Survey of Political Polarization. Sampling errors and statistical tests of significance take into account the effect of weighting.

¹ When data collection for the 2014 Political Polarization and Typology Survey began, non-internet users were subsampled at a rate of 25%, but a decision was made shortly thereafter to invite all non-internet users to join. In total, 83% of non-internet users were invited to join the panel.

The Web component of the first wave had a response rate of 61% (2,901 responses among 4,753 Web-based individuals enrolled in the panel); the telephone component had a response rate of 70% (407 responses among 585 non-Web individuals enrolled in the panel). Taking account of the response rate for the 2014 Survey of Political Polarization (10.6%), the cumulative response rate for the first ATP wave is 3.6%.

**PEW RESEARCH CENTER
2014 POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND TYPOLOGY SURVEY
FINAL TOPLINE**

Phase A: January 23-February 9, 2014 N=3,341

Phase B: February 12-26, 2014 N=3,337

Phase C: February 27-March 16, 2014 N=3,335

Combined N=10,013

QUESTION A1 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

ASK ALL PHASE C:

Q.C1 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President? **[IF DK ENTER AS DK. IF DEPENDS PROBE ONCE WITH: Overall do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President? IF STILL DEPENDS ENTER AS DK]**

	<u>Approve</u>	Dis- <u>Approve</u>	(VOL.) <u>DK/Ref</u>		<u>Approve</u>	Dis- <u>Approve</u>	(VOL.) <u>DK/Ref</u>
Feb 27-Mar 16, 2014	44	49	7	Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011	47	45	8
Feb 14-23, 2014	44	48	8	Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011	51	39	10
Jan 15-19, 2014 (U)	43	49	8	Feb 2-7, 2011	49	42	9
Dec 3-8, 2013 (U)	45	49	6	Jan 5-9, 2011	46	44	10
Oct 30-Nov 6, 2013	41	53	6	Dec 1-5, 2010	45	43	13
Oct 9-13, 2013	43	51	6	Nov 4-7, 2010	44	44	12
Sep 4-8, 2013 (U)	44	49	8	Oct 13-18, 2010	46	45	9
Jul 17-21, 2013	46	46	7	Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010	47	44	9
Jun 12-16, 2013	49	43	7	Jul 21-Aug 5, 2010	47	41	12
May 1-5, 2013	51	43	6	Jun 8-28, 2010	48	41	11
Mar 13-17, 2013	47	46	8	Jun 16-20, 2010	48	43	9
Feb 13-18, 2013 (U)	51	41	7	May 6-9, 2010	47	42	11
Jan 9-13, 2013	52	40	7	Apr 21-26, 2010	47	42	11
Dec 5-9, 2012	55	39	6	Apr 8-11, 2010	48	43	9
Jun 28-Jul 9, 2012	50	43	7	Mar 10-14, 2010	46	43	12
Jun 7-17, 2012	47	45	8	Feb 3-9, 2010	49	39	12
May 9-Jun 3, 2012	46	42	11	Jan 6-10, 2010	49	42	10
Apr 4-15, 2012	46	45	9	Dec 9-13, 2009	49	40	11
Mar 7-11, 2012	50	41	9	Oct 28-Nov 8, 2009	51	36	13
Feb 8-12, 2012	47	43	10	Sep 30-Oct 4, 2009	52	36	12
Jan 11-16, 2012	44	48	8	Sep 10-15, 2009	55	33	13
Dec 7-11, 2011	46	43	11	Aug 20-27, 2009	52	37	12
Nov 9-14, 2011	46	46	8	Aug 11-17, 2009	51	37	11
Sep 22-Oct 4, 2011	43	48	9	Jul 22-26, 2009	54	34	12
Aug 17-21, 2011	43	49	7	Jun 10-14, 2009	61	30	9
Jul 20-24, 2011	44	48	8	Apr 14-21, 2009	63	26	11
Jun 15-19, 2011	46	45	8	Mar 31-Apr 6, 2009	61	26	13
May 25-30, 2011	52	39	10	Mar 9-12, 2009	59	26	15
May 5-8, 2011	50	39	11	Feb 4-8, 2009	64	17	19
May 2, 2011 (WP)	56	38	6				

ASK IF APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE (Q.C1=1,2):

Q.C1a Do you [approve/disapprove] very strongly, or not so strongly?

BASED ON TOTAL PHASE C:

	-----Approve-----				-----Disapprove-----				(VOL.) DK/Ref
	Total	Very <u>strongly</u>	Not so <u>strongly</u>	(VOL.) <u>DK/Ref</u>	Total	Very <u>strongly</u>	Not so <u>strongly</u>	(VOL.) <u>DK/Ref</u>	
Feb 27-Mar 16, 2014	44	26	17	1	49	38	11	1	7
Dec 3-8, 2013 (U)	45	26	16	3	49	39	9	1	6
Jun 12-16, 2013	49	31	17	2	43	33	10	*	7
Jan 9-13, 2013	52	35	15	2	40	31	8	1	7
Apr 4-15, 2012	46	30	15	2	45	36	8	1	9

Q.C1a CONTINUED...

	-----Approve-----				-----Disapprove-----				(VOL.) DK/Ref
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Very strongly</u>	<u>Not so strongly</u>	(VOL.) <u>DK/Ref</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Very strongly</u>	<u>Not so strongly</u>	(VOL.) <u>DK/Ref</u>	
Jan 11-16, 2012	44	27	15	2	48	35	12	1	8
Sep 22-Oct 4, 2011	43	26	15	2	48	34	13	1	9
Aug 17-21, 2011	43	26	15	2	49	38	11	1	7
Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011	51	32	18	2	39	29	10	1	10
Jan 5-9, 2011	46	27	16	2	44	30	13	1	10
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010	47	28	17	2	44	32	11	1	9
Jun 16-20, 2010	48	29	17	2	43	31	11	1	9
Jan 6-10, 2010	49	30	15	3	42	30	11	1	10
Apr 14-21, 2009	63	45	13	5	26	18	8	*	11

QUESTIONS B2-B3 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**QUESTIONS B4-B5 PREVIOUSLY RELEASED****ASK ALL PHASE A:**

Q.A6 If you could live anywhere in the United States that you wanted to, would you prefer a city, a suburban area, a small town or a rural area?

	(SDT)
<u>2014</u>	<u>2008</u>
24 City	23
21 Suburban area	25
30 Small town	30
24 Rural area	21
2 Don't know/Refused (VOL.)	1

NO QUESTION 7**ASK ALL PHASE A:**

Imagine for a moment that you are moving to another community.

ASK ALL PHASE A:

Q.A8 Would you prefer to live in **[INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE]**?

<u>2014</u>	
49	A community where the houses are larger and farther apart, but schools, stores, and restaurants are several miles away [OR]
48	A community where the houses are smaller and closer to each other, but schools, stores, and restaurants are within walking distance
2	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)

ASK ALL PHASE A:

Q.A9 Still imagining that you are moving to another community. In deciding where to live, would each of the following be important, or not too important to you. First, would **[INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE]** be important, or not too important? What about **[NEXT ITEM]**?

	<u>Important</u>	<u>Not too important</u>	(VOL.) <u>DK/Ref</u>
a. Living in a place where most people share your political views Jan 23-Feb 9, 2014	28	71	1
b. Having high-quality public schools Jan 23-Feb 9, 2014	79	20	*

Q.A9 CONTINUED...

		<u>Important</u>	<u>Not too important</u>	(VOL.) <u>DK/Ref</u>
c.	Living in a place with a mix of people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds Jan 23-Feb 9, 2014	45	54	1
d.	Living in a place with many people who share your religious faith Jan 23-Feb 9, 2014	36	63	1
e.	Being near art museums and theaters Jan 23-Feb 9, 2014	46	54	1
f.	Having easy access to the outdoors for things like hiking, fishing, and camping Jan 23-Feb 9, 2014	67	33	*
g.	Being near your extended family Jan 23-Feb 9, 2014	71	28	1

NO QUESTION 10**ASK ALL:**

Next,

Q.11 Would you say your overall opinion of... **[INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE]** is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable? **[INTERVIEWERS: PROBE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN "NEVER HEARD OF" AND "CAN'T RATE."]** How about **[NEXT ITEM]**?

	----- Favorable -----			----- Unfavorable -----			(VOL.)	(VOL.)
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Very</u>	<u>Mostly</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Very</u>	<u>Mostly</u>	<u>Never heard of</u>	<u>Can't rate/Ref</u>
a. The Republican Party								
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	37	7	30	55	24	31	*	7
Dec 3-8, 2013 (U)	35	8	27	59	28	31	0	6
Oct 9-13, 2013	38	5	32	58	26	32	*	4
Jul 17-21, 2013	33	7	25	58	25	34	*	9
Jun 12-16, 2013	40	8	32	55	23	33	*	5
Jan 9-13, 2013	33	6	28	58	27	31	1	8
Dec 5-9, 2012	36	7	28	59	23	36	*	5
Sep 12-16, 2012	42	12	30	50	25	26	*	8
Jun 28-Jul 9, 2012	36	9	27	56	28	28	*	8
Mar 7-11, 2012	36	7	30	56	27	29	*	8
Jan 11-16, 2012	35	7	27	58	28	30	*	7
Sep 22-Oct 4, 2011	36	7	29	55	27	28	*	9
Aug 17-21, 2011	34	5	29	59	27	32	*	7
Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011	42	9	32	51	22	28	1	7
Feb 2-7, 2011	43	8	35	48	19	29	*	9
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010	43	8	35	49	21	28	*	8
July 1-5, 2010	39	10	29	49	24	25	*	12
April 1-5, 2010	37	8	29	53	26	27	*	9
Mar 18-21, 2010	37	5	32	51	20	31	*	12
Feb 3-9, 2010	46	5	41	46	14	32	0	8
Aug 20-27, 2009	40	6	34	50	19	31	*	10
Aug 11-17, 2009	40	7	33	50	18	32	*	10
Mar 31-Apr 6, 2009	40	7	33	51	17	34	0	9
Jan 7-11, 2009	40	5	35	55	21	34	*	5
Late October, 2008	40	10	30	50	23	27	*	10
Mid-September, 2008	47	11	36	46	22	24	*	7
August, 2008	43	9	34	49	18	31	1	7
Late May, 2008	39	7	32	53	20	33	*	8

Q.11 CONTINUED...

	----- Favorable -----			----- Unfavorable -----			(VOL.)	(VOL.)
	Total	Very	Mostly	Total	Very	Mostly	Never heard of	Can't rate/Ref
July, 2007	39	7	32	53	22	31	0	8
Early January, 2007	41	9	32	48	21	27	1	10
Late October, 2006	41	9	32	50	20	30	*	9
July, 2006	40	10	30	52	23	29	1	7
April, 2006	40	10	30	50	21	29	*	10
February, 2006	44	11	33	50	24	26	*	6
Late October, 2005	42	12	30	49	24	25	*	9
July, 2005	48	13	35	43	18	25	*	9
June, 2005	48	11	37	44	20	24	0	8
December, 2004	52	15	37	42	17	25	0	6
June, 2004	51	12	39	40	14	26	0	9
Early February, 2004	52	14	38	42	16	26	*	6
June, 2003	58	14	44	33	10	23	0	9
April, 2003	63	14	49	31	10	21	*	6
December, 2002	59	18	41	33	11	22	*	8
July, 2001	48	11	37	42	15	27	*	10
January, 2001	56	13	43	35	13	22	*	9
September, 2000 (RVs)	53	11	42	40	12	28	0	7
August, 1999	53	8	45	43	12	31	*	4
February, 1999	44	7	37	51	15	36	0	5
January, 1999	44	10	34	50	23	27	0	6
Early December, 1998	46	11	35	47	20	27	*	7
Early October, 1998 (RVs)	52	9	43	42	14	28	0	6
Early September, 1998	56	9	47	37	11	26	*	7
March, 1998	50	10	40	43	12	31	*	7
August, 1997	47	9	38	47	11	36	*	6
June, 1997	51	8	43	42	11	31	1	6
January, 1997	52	8	44	43	10	33	*	5
October, 1995	52	10	42	44	16	28	*	4
December, 1994	67	21	46	27	8	19	*	6
July, 1994	63	12	51	33	8	25	*	4
May, 1993	54	12	42	35	10	25	0	11
July, 1992	46	9	37	48	17	31	*	6
b. The Democratic Party								
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	46	12	34	47	23	24	*	7
Dec 3-8, 2013 (U)	47	15	32	48	24	24	*	5
Oct 9-13, 2013	47	9	39	48	22	27	0	4
Jul 17-21, 2013	41	10	31	50	23	28	*	9
Jun 12-16, 2013	51	14	37	45	19	26	0	5
Jan 9-13, 2013	47	13	34	46	18	28	*	7
Dec 5-9, 2012	48	11	37	47	23	25	1	4
Sep 12-16, 2012	53	21	32	40	18	22	*	7
Jun 28-Jul 9, 2012	47	14	33	45	21	24	*	8
Mar 7-11, 2012	49	14	36	43	18	25	*	7
Jan 11-16, 2012	43	13	29	51	23	28	*	7
Sep 22-Oct 4, 2011	46	13	32	45	19	26	*	9
Aug 17-21, 2011	43	9	34	50	21	29	*	7
Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011	48	14	34	45	18	27	*	6
Feb 2-7, 2011	47	13	35	46	17	29	*	6
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010	50	13	36	44	20	24	*	7
July 1-5, 2010	44	12	31	45	22	23	*	11
April 1-5, 2010	38	9	29	52	27	25	*	9
Mar 18-21, 2010	40	8	32	49	25	24	*	11
Feb 3-9, 2010	48	9	39	44	17	27	*	8
Aug 20-27, 2009	48	11	37	43	19	24	*	10
Aug 11-17, 2009	49	12	37	40	16	25	*	10

Q.11 CONTINUED...

	----- Favorable -----			----- Unfavorable -----			(VOL.)	(VOL.)
	Total	Very	Mostly	Total	Very	Mostly	Never heard of	Can't rate/Ref
Mar 31-Apr 6, 2009	59	15	44	34	13	21	*	7
Jan 7-11, 2009	62	19	43	32	12	20	*	6
Late October, 2008	57	19	38	33	15	18	*	10
Mid-September, 2008	55	18	37	39	14	25	*	6
August, 2008	57	16	41	37	13	24	*	6
Late May, 2008	57	14	43	37	14	23	*	6
July, 2007	51	13	38	41	14	27	0	8
Early January, 2007	54	15	39	35	12	23	*	11
Late October, 2006	53	13	40	36	11	25	*	11
July, 2006	47	13	34	44	13	31	2	7
April, 2006	47	12	35	42	14	28	*	11
February, 2006	48	14	34	44	17	27	0	8
Late October, 2005	49	14	35	41	15	26	*	10
July, 2005	50	15	35	41	14	27	*	9
June, 2005	52	12	40	39	13	26	*	9
December, 2004	53	13	40	41	14	27	*	6
June, 2004	54	12	42	36	11	25	0	10
Early February, 2004	58	14	44	37	9	28	*	5
June, 2003	54	11	43	38	10	28	0	8
April, 2003	57	13	44	36	11	25	*	7
December, 2002	54	15	39	37	10	27	*	9
July, 2001	58	18	40	34	10	24	*	8
January, 2001	60	18	42	30	9	21	1	9
September, 2000 (RVs)	60	16	44	35	12	23	*	5
August, 1999	59	14	45	37	9	28	*	4
February, 1999	58	11	47	37	11	26	0	5
January, 1999	55	14	41	38	12	26	0	7
Early December, 1998	59	18	41	34	10	24	0	7
Early October, 1998 (RVs)	56	11	45	38	9	29	*	6
Early September, 1998	60	13	47	33	8	25	*	7
March, 1998	58	15	43	36	10	26	*	6
August, 1997	52	11	41	42	10	32	0	6
June, 1997	61	10	51	33	8	25	*	6
January, 1997	60	13	47	35	7	28	*	5
October, 1995	49	9	40	48	11	37	0	3
December, 1994	50	13	37	44	13	31	*	6
July, 1994	62	13	49	34	7	27	*	4
May, 1993	57	14	43	34	9	25	0	9
July, 1992	61	17	44	33	9	24	*	6

ITEM cb PREVIOUSLY RELEASED**NO ITEMS d, f-g****ITEMS eb, hb-jb HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**

ASK ALL PHASE C:

Q.11 Would you say your overall opinion of the Republican Party is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly Unfavorable, or very unfavorable? **[INTERVIEWERS: PROBE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN "NEVER HEARD OF" AND "CAN'T RATE."]** How about **[NEXT ITEM]**?

ASK IF VERY UNFAVORABLE VIEW OF REPUBLICAN PARTY (Q11a=4):

Q.11at Would you say the Republican Party's policies are so misguided that they threaten the nation's well-being, or wouldn't you go that far?

Feb 27-Mar 16

2014

37	NET Favorable
57	NET Unfavorable
25	Very unfavorable
15	Policies pose a threat
9	Wouldn't go that far
*	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
32	Mostly unfavorable
*	Never heard of (VOL.)
6	Can't rate/Refused (VOL.)

ASK ALL PHASE C:

Q.11 Would you say your overall opinion of the Democratic Party is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly Unfavorable, or very unfavorable? **[INTERVIEWERS: PROBE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN "NEVER HEARD OF" AND "CAN'T RATE."]** How about **[NEXT ITEM]**?

ASK IF VERY UNFAVORABLE VIEW OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY (Q11b=4):

Q.11bt Would you say the Democratic Party's policies are so misguided that they threaten the nation's well-being, or wouldn't you go that far?

Feb 27-Mar 16

2014

49	NET Favorable
45	NET Unfavorable
22	Very unfavorable
16	Policies pose a threat
5	Wouldn't go that far
1	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
23	Mostly unfavorable
*	Never heard of (VOL.)
6	Can't rate/Refused (VOL.)

ASK ALL PHASE B:

Q.B12 Thinking about elected officials in Washington who share your positions on the most important issues facing the nation. **[READ AND RANDOMIZE]**

Feb 12-Feb 26

2014

58	Should they work with elected officials they disagree with, even if it results in some policies you don't like [OR]
36	Should they stand up for their positions, even if that means little gets done in Washington
6	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)

NO QUESTIONS 13-24

ASK ALL:

Q.25 I'm going to read you some pairs of statements that will help us understand how you feel about a number of things. As I read each pair, tell me whether the FIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes closer to your own views — even if neither is exactly right. The first pair is **[READ AND RANDOMIZE PAIRS BUT NOT STATEMENTS WITHIN EACH PAIR]**. Next, **[NEXT PAIR]** **[IF NECESSARY: "Which statement comes closer to your views, even if neither is exactly right?"]**

	Government is almost always wasteful and <u>inefficient</u>	Government often does a better job than people <u>give it credit for</u>	(VOL.) Both/Neither/ <u>DK/Ref</u>	
a.				
	Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	56	40	4
	Dec 3-8, 2013	55	39	6
	Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	55	39	6
	Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010 (RVs)	61	35	4
	December, 2008	53	40	7
	October, 2008	57	35	8
	September, 2005	56	39	5
	December, 2004	47	45	8
	June, 2003	48	46	6
	September, 2000	52	40	8
	August, 1999	51	43	6
	June, 1997	59	36	5
	October, 1996	56	39	5
	April, 1995	63	34	3
	October, 1994	64	32	4
	July, 1994	66	31	3
	Government regulation of business is necessary to <u>protect the public interest</u>	Government regulation of business usually does <u>more harm than good</u>	(VOL.) Both/Neither/ <u>DK/Ref</u>	
b.				
	Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	47	47	5
	Feb 8-12, 2012 ¹	40	52	7
	Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	47	45	8
	December, 2008	47	43	10
	October, 2008	50	38	12
	January, 2008	41	50	9
	December, 2004	49	41	10
	July, 2002	54	36	10
	February, 2002	50	41	9
	August, 1999	48	44	8
	October, 1996	45	46	9
	October, 1995	45	50	5
	April, 1995	43	51	6
	October, 1994	38	55	7
	July, 1994	41	54	5

¹ In Feb 8-12, 2012 survey, question was asked as a stand-alone item.

Q.25 CONTINUED...

	Poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without doing anything in <u>return</u>	Poor people have hard lives because government benefits don't go far enough to help them live <u>decently</u>	(VOL.) Both/Neither/ DK/Ref	
c.				
	Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	44	47	9
	Dec 3-8, 2013	43	43	14
	May 1-5, 2013	45	44	11
	Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	41	47	12
	January, 2008	34	52	14
	December, 2005	35	51	14
	September, 2005	38	51	11
	December, 2004	34	52	14
	June, 2003	34	55	11
	August, 1999	45	42	13
	June, 1997	45	42	13
	October, 1996	46	40	14
	October, 1995	54	36	10
	April, 1995	52	39	9
	October, 1994	48	41	11
	July, 1994	53	39	8

	The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means going deeper into <u>debt</u>	The government today can't afford to do much <u>more to help the needy</u>	(VOL.) Both/Neither/ DK/Ref	
d.				
	Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	43	51	6
	Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	41	51	8
	December, 2008	55	35	10
	October, 2008	51	37	12
	April, 2007	63	28	9
	December, 2004	57	33	10
	August, 1999	57	35	8
	October, 1996	46	44	10
	April, 1996	49	44	7
	October, 1995	47	47	6
	April, 1995	46	47	7
	October, 1994	50	43	7
	July, 1994	48	47	5

NO ITEM e

	Racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can't get <u>ahead these days</u>	Blacks who can't get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for <u>their own condition</u>	(VOL.) Both/Neither/ DK/Ref	
f.				
	Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	27	63	10
	Jan 4-8, 2012	21	60	19
	Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	26	60	14
	Oct 28-Nov 30, 2009	18	67	15
	September, 2005	26	59	15
	December, 2004	27	60	13
	June, 2003	24	64	12

Q.25 CONTINUED...

September, 2000	31	54	15
August, 1999	28	59	13
October, 1997	25	61	14
June, 1997	33	54	13
October, 1996	28	58	14
October, 1995	37	53	10
April, 1995	34	56	10
October, 1994	34	54	12
July, 1994	32	59	9

	Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work <u>and talents</u>	Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health <u>care</u>	(VOL.) Both/Neither/ DK/Ref
g.			
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	57	35	8
Dec 3-8, 2013	53	35	11
Oct 30-Nov 6, 2013	49	49	11
Mar 13-17, 2013	49	49	10
Jan 4-8, 2012	48	48	15
Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	45	45	12
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010 (RVs)	44	44	14
Jul 21-Aug 5, 2010	42	42	13
Jun 16-20, 2010	39	39	11
Oct 28-Nov 30, 2009	46	46	14
October, 2006	41	41	18
March, 2006	41	41	7
December, 2005	45	44	11
December, 2004	45	44	11
June, 2003	46	44	10
September, 2000	50	38	12
August, 1999	46	44	10
October, 1997	41	48	11
June, 1997	41	48	11
April, 1997	38	52	10
June, 1996	37	54	9
July, 1994	31	63	6

ITEM h HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

	The best way to ensure peace is through military <u>strength</u>	Good diplomacy is the <u>best way to ensure peace</u>	(VOL.) Both/Neither/ DK/Ref
i.			
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	30	62	8
Dec 3-8, 2013	31	57	12
Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	31	58	11
October, 2006	28	57	15
December, 2004	30	55	15
August, 1999	33	55	12
October, 1996	36	53	11
October, 1995	36	59	5
April, 1995	35	58	7

Q.25 CONTINUED...

October, 1994	40	52	8
July, 1994	36	58	6

ITEMS j-m HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

n.	<u>Business corporations make too much profit</u>	<u>Most corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit</u>	<u>(VOL.) Both/Neither/ DK/Ref</u>
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	56	39	4
Mar 13-17, 2013	53	41	6
Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	54	39	7
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010 (RVs)	54	39	6
December, 2008	58	35	7
October, 2008	59	33	8
December, 2005	61	33	6
December, 2004	53	39	8
June, 2003	51	42	7
July, 2002	58	33	9
February, 2002	54	39	7
September, 2000	54	38	8
August, 1999	52	42	6
June, 1997	51	43	6
October, 1996	51	42	7
October, 1995	53	43	4
April, 1995	51	44	5
October, 1994	50	44	6
July, 1994	52	43	5

**ITEMS o-p HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE
QUESTIONS B26-C26 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**

ASK ALL:

OFTVOTE How often would you say you vote... [READ IN ORDER]?

BASED ON REGISTERED VOTERS [N=8,000]:

	<u>Always</u>	<u>Nearly always</u>	<u>Part of the time</u>	<u>Seldom</u>	<u>(VOL.) Never vote</u>	<u>(VOL.) Other</u>	<u>(VOL.) DK/Ref</u>
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	61	24	8	5	1	*	*
Oct 31-Nov 3, 2012	62	23	7	5	2	1	*
Oct 24-28, 2012	59	24	8	5	3	1	*
Oct 4-7, 2012	67	20	6	4	1	1	0
Sep 12-16, 2012	64	22	7	4	2	1	*
Jun 7-17, 2012	64	24	6	4	1	*	*
Apr 4-15, 2012	57	29	8	4	1	*	*
Jan 4-8, 2012	60	24	8	6	1	1	*
Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	62	24	8	4	1	*	*
Oct 27-30, 2010	58	24	11	5	2	1	*
Oct 13-18, 2010	57	27	10	4	2	1	*
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010	59	26	9	4	1	*	*
June 16-20, 2010	52	31	11	5	1	1	1
Mar 31-Apr 6, 2009	62	23	7	5	1	1	1
November, 2008	60	23	8	5	2	2	*
Late October, 2008	57	26	8	5	3	1	*

OFTVOTE CONTINUED...

	<u>Always</u>	<u>Nearly always</u>	<u>Part of the time</u>	<u>Seldom</u>	<u>(VOL.) Never vote</u>	<u>(VOL.) Other</u>	<u>(VOL.) DK/Ref</u>
Mid-October, 2008	57	27	7	5	3	1	*
Early October, 2008	53	27	9	6	3	1	1
Late September, 2008	55	27	9	6	2	1	*
Mid-September, 2008	54	28	10	5	2	1	*
August, 2008	55	29	9	4	2	1	*
July, 2008	53	30	10	4	1	1	1
January, 2007	58	29	9	3	1	*	*
November, 2006	58	26	8	5	2	1	*
Late October, 2006	58	27	9	4	1	1	*
Early October, 2006	47	36	10	3	2	1	1
September, 2006	56	28	9	6	1	*	*
May, 2006	60	26	8	4	1	*	1
December, 2005	60	24	9	4	2	1	1
December, 2004	64	22	8	4	1	*	1
November, 2004	62	21	7	6	3	1	*
Mid-October, 2004	63	22	7	5	2	1	*
Early October, 2004	58	25	9	4	2	1	1
September, 2004	58	27	9	5	2	1	1
August, 2004	56	28	9	5	2	*	1
July, 2004	54	31	9	4	1	*	*
June, 2004	57	29	7	5	1	1	1
May, 2004	56	27	10	4	2	1	1
April, 2004	55	29	9	5	1	1	1
Late March, 2004	50	31	11	6	1	*	1
Mid-March, 2004	55	30	9	5	1	*	*
February, 2004	55	29	12	3	*	*	*
January, 2004	54	30	10	4	2	1	*
August, 2003	53	30	10	5	1	*	*
June, 2003	48	36	11	3	1	*	0
Early November, 2002	52	30	11	6	1	0	1
Early October, 2002	50	33	11	4	*	1	1
Early September, 2002	59	25	11	4	1	*	*
August, 2002	53	32	10	4	1	*	*
May, 2002	53	31	9	5	1	*	1
Early November, 2000	57	26	8	6	2	1	*
Late October, 2000	52	30	9	6	1	2	0
Mid-October, 2000	54	27	10	6	*	3	*
Early October, 2000	51	29	10	6	3	1	*
September, 2000	61	21	9	7	2	*	*
July, 2000	48	30	13	6	2	1	*
June, 2000	58	26	10	4	1	1	*
May, 2000	52	29	12	6	1	1	*
April, 2000	50	30	12	6	2	1	*
March, 2000	49	34	12	4	1	1	0
February, 2000	53	32	10	4	1	0	*
January, 2000	50	34	12	4	1	*	*
October, 1999	39	47	9	2	1	*	*
Late September, 1999	40	47	9	3	1	*	*
Late October, 1998	56	28	10	5	1	*	*
Early October, 1998	50	32	11	5	1	1	*
Early September, 1998	53	33	9	4	-	1	*
Late August, 1998	48	35	13	4	*	0	*
June, 1998	49	33	12	5	-	1	0
May, 1998	52	29	12	6	1	1	*

OFTVOTE CONTINUED...

	<u>Always</u>	<u>Nearly always</u>	<u>Part of the time</u>	<u>Seldom</u>	(VOL.) <u>Never vote</u>	(VOL.) <u>Other</u>	(VOL.) <u>DK/Ref</u>
November, 1997	42	44	10	3	1	*	*
October, 1997	62	26	8	3	1	*	*
June, 1997	54	30	10	4	1	*	*
November, 1996	55	28	8	6	2	1	*
October, 1996	52	30	9	5	2	2	*
Late September, 1996	52	31	10	4	2	1	*
Early September, 1996	53	29	12	4	1	*	*
July, 1996	52	33	8	5	1	1	*
June, 1996	52	33	9	4	1	1	*
Late April, 1996	44	37	11	5	1	1	1
Early April, 1996	49	35	10	5	1	*	*
February, 1996	42	41	11	4	1	1	*
October, 1995	53	35	7	4	1	*	*
April, 1995	53	34	9	4	*	*	*
November, 1994	58	28	8	5	*	1	0
Late October, 1994	55	32	10	3	*	*	*
July, 1994	52	34	10	4	*	*	*
May, 1993	57	31	7	4	1	1	*
Early October, 1992	54	33	8	4	*	1	*
September, 1992	52	33	8	5	1	1	*
June, 1992	60	29	7	3	1	*	*
May, 1992	50	35	10	4	1	*	*
Early May, 1992	49	35	10	4	1	*	*
March, 1992	47	36	11	6	*	*	*
February, 1992	50	36	9	4	*	--	2
January 1992 (GP) ²	40	35	11	11	4	--	*
November, 1991	46	41	9	4	*	*	*
May, 1990	42	42	11	4	1	*	*
January, 1989 (GP)	45	30	10	8	6	1	*
<i>Gallup</i> : November, 1988	57	26	10	4	2	1	*
October, 1988	51	37	8	3	1	*	*
May, 1988	43	41	11	3	2	1	*
January, 1988	49	39	9	2	1	*	*
September, 1988	51	40	6	2	*	1	*
May, 1987	43	43	9	3	1	1	*

² Trends for January, 1992 and January, 1989 are based on general public.

ASK ALL PHASE A:

Now a different kind of question,

Q.26F1/F2 Thinking about how Barack Obama and Republican leaders should address the most important issues facing the country. Imagine a scale from zero to 100 where 100 means **[IF FORM 1: Republican leaders get everything they want and Obama gets nothing he wants, and zero means Obama gets everything and Republican leaders get nothing/IF FORM 2: Obama gets everything he wants and Republican leaders get nothing they want, and zero means Republican leaders get everything and Obama gets nothing.]** Where on this scale from zero to 100 do you think they should end up? **[OPEN END ENTER NUMBER 0-100] [IF NECESSARY: " [FORM 1: 100 means Republicans get everything they want, ZERO means Obama gets everything he wants/ FORM 2: 100 means Obama gets everything he wants, ZERO means Republicans gets everything they want], about where, from 0 to 100 should they end up?] [INTERVIEWER, IF RESPONDENT STRUGGLES WITH PRECISE NUMBER YOU CAN SAY: "you can just give me a number close to what you think"] [IF RESPONDENT SAYS A NUMBER BETWEEN [FORM 1: 0-49, FORM 2: 51-100] CLARIFY: "Just to be sure I get this right, [INSERT NUMBER CHOSEN], means Obama should get more than Republican leaders, is that what you meant?" [IF NO, RESPONDENT MEANT REP LEADERS SHOULD GET MORE: "A number between [FORM 1: 51 and 100, FORM 2: 0 and 49] would mean Republican leaders get more than Obama" [IF RESPONDENT SAYS A NUMBER BETWEEN [FORM 1: 51-100, FORM 2: 0-49] CLARIFY: "Just to be sure I get this right, [INSERT NUMBER CHOSEN], means Republican leaders should get more than Obama, is that what you meant?" [IF NO, RESPONDENT MEANT OBAMA SHOULD GET MORE: "A number between [FORM 1: 0 and 49, FORM 2: 51 and 100] would mean Obama gets more than Republican leaders"]**

Jan 23-Feb 9

2014

7	0-9 (Extreme Obama)
2	10-19
5	20-29
5	30-39
7	40-49
49	50
4	51-60
4	61-70
5	71-80
1	81-90
5	91-100 (Extreme Republican leaders)
5	Don't know/Refused

QUESTION B27/B27a HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**ASK ALL PHASE C:**

Now, I have a short set of questions on marriage and family.

Q.C28 First, how do you think you would react if a member of your immediate family told you they were going to marry... **[INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE]**? Would you be generally happy about this, generally unhappy, or wouldn't it matter to you at all? What about **[NEXT ITEM]**? **[IF NECESSARY: if a member of your immediate family told you they were going to marry [ITEM], would you be generally happy, generally unhappy, or wouldn't it matter to you at all?]**
[INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: IF RESPONDENT SAYS THEY HAVE FAMILY MEMBER(S) MARRIED TO SOMEONE OF THAT GROUP]: "Are you happy about that, unhappy about that, or doesn't it matter?"

		Happy	Unhappy	Wouldn't matter to you at all	(VOL.) DK/Ref
a.	A Republican				
	Feb 27-Mar 16, 2014	13	9	77	1
	Jan 2-5, 2014	17	8	74	2

Q.C28 CONTINUED...

		<u>Happy</u>	<u>Unhappy</u>	<u>Wouldn't matter to you at all</u>	(VOL.) DK/Ref
b.	A Democrat				
	Feb 27-Mar 16, 2014	15	8	76	1
	Jan 2-5, 2014	15	10	73	2
c.	Someone who didn't go to college				
	Feb 27-Mar 16, 2014	6	14	79	1
	Jan 2-5, 2014	5	17	76	2
d.	Someone born and raised outside the U.S.				
	Feb 27-Mar 16, 2014	10	7	81	2
	Jan 2-5, 2014	11	11	75	2
e.	Someone who does not believe in God				
	Feb 27-Mar 16, 2014	4	49	46	1
	Jan 2-5, 2014	3	53	42	3
f.	A "born again" Christian				
	Feb 27-Mar 16, 2014	32	9	57	2
	Jan 2-5, 2014 ³	38	7	53	1
g.	A gun owner				
	Feb 27-Mar 16, 2014	17	19	62	1
	January 2-5, 2014 ⁴	16	24	58	2
h.	Someone of a different race				
	Feb 27-Mar 16, 2014	9	11	79	1

ASK ALL PHASE A:

Q.A29 Thinking about some news organizations, would you say your overall opinion of... **[INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE]** is favorable, unfavorable, or neither in particular? How about **[NEXT ITEM]**? **[IF NECESSARY: Is your overall opinion of [ITEM] favorable, unfavorable, or neither in particular]**

		<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>	<u>Neither in particular</u>	(VOL.) DK/Ref
a.	MSNBC cable news				
	Jan 23-Feb 9, 2014	34	20	41	5
b.	The Fox News Cable Channel				
	Jan 23-Feb 9, 2014	42	24	29	4

NO QUESTIONS 30-39

ASK ALL:

Q.40 Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs...**[READ]**?

	<u>Most of the time</u>	<u>Some of the time</u>	<u>Only now and then</u>	<u>Hardly at all</u>	(VOL.) DK/Ref
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	48	29	14	9	*
Oct 31-Nov 3, 2012 (RVs)	69	21	7	3	*
Oct 24-28, 2012	51	27	13	9	1
Oct 4-7, 2012 (RVs)	65	23	8	4	*
Sep 12-16, 2012 (RVs)	60	26	10	4	*
Sep 22-Oct 4, 2011	47	28	15	8	1
Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	50	29	14	6	1
Oct 27-30, 2010 (RVs)	56	29	10	5	*

³ In Jan 2-5, 2014 survey, item was worded: "Someone who is a 'born again' Christian."

⁴ In Jan 2-5, 2014 survey, item was worded: "Someone who owns a gun."

Q.40 CONTINUED...

	<u>Most of the time</u>	<u>Some of the time</u>	<u>Only now and then</u>	<u>Hardly at all</u>	(VOL.) DK/Ref
Oct 13-18, 2010	49	28	12	10	1
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010 ⁵	52	25	13	10	1
January, 2007	53	28	11	7	1
November, 2006 (RVs)	58	26	10	6	*
Late October, 2006 (RVs)	57	30	8	5	*
December, 2005	50	28	14	8	*
December, 2004	45	35	14	5	1
November, 2004 (RVs)	61	27	9	3	*
Mid-October, 2004 (RVs)	63	26	8	3	*
June, 2004	44	34	15	7	*
August, 2003	48	33	12	6	1
November, 2002	49	27	14	9	1
August, 2002	54	30	11	5	*
March, 2001	49	27	13	10	1
Early November, 2000 (RVs)	51	32	12	5	*
September, 2000 (RVs)	51	34	10	4	1
June, 2000	38	32	19	11	*
Late September, 1999	39	32	20	9	*
August, 1999	40	35	17	8	*
November, 1998	46	27	14	13	*
Late October, 1998 (RVs)	57	29	10	4	*
Early October, 1998 (RVs)	51	33	11	5	*
Early September, 1998	45	34	15	6	*
June, 1998	36	34	21	9	*
November, 1997	41	36	16	7	*
November, 1996 (RVs)	52	32	12	4	*
October, 1996 (RVs)	43	37	13	6	1
June, 1996	41	34	17	8	*
October, 1995	46	35	14	5	*
April, 1995	43	35	16	6	*
November, 1994	49	30	13	7	1
October, 1994	45	35	14	6	*
July, 1994	46	33	15	6	*
May, 1990	39	34	18	9	*
February, 1989	47	34	14	4	1
October, 1988 (RVs)	52	33	12	3	*
May, 1988	37	37	17	6	3
January, 1988	37	35	18	8	2
November, 1987	49	32	14	4	1
May, 1987	41	35	15	7	2
July, 1985	36	33	18	12	1

**QUESTIONS B40a- 43, C48-49 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE
NO QUESTIONS 44-47**

⁵ In the Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010 survey, a wording experiment was conducted with one half of respondents asked the question wording shown above, and the other half was asked: "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs ...?" No significant differences were found between questions and the combined results are shown above. All surveys prior to Sep 2010 used the longer question wording.

ASK ALL:

Q.50 Now I'm going to read a few more pairs of statements. Again, just tell me whether the FIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes closer to your own views — even if neither is exactly right. The first pair is **[READ AND RANDOMIZE ITEMS Q THRU Z FOLLOWED BY RANDOMIZED ITEMS AA THRU HH; RANDOMIZE PAIRS BUT NOT STATEMENTS WITHIN EACH PAIR]**. Next, **[NEXT PAIR] [IF NECESSARY: "Which statement comes closer to your views, even if neither is exactly right?"]**

ITEM q HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

r.	Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt <u>the economy</u>	Stricter environmental laws and regulations are <u>worth the cost</u>	(VOL.) Both/Neither/DK/Ref
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	39	56	5
Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	39	53	7
November, 2007	27	63	10
July, 2006	31	57	12
March, 2006	29	65	6
December, 2005	37	56	7
December, 2004	31	60	9
September, 2000	31	61	8
August, 1999	28	65	7
October, 1996	30	63	7
October, 1995	35	61	4
April, 1995	39	57	4
October, 1994	32	62	6
July, 1994	33	62	5

ITEMS s-t HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**ASK ALL:**

u.	Homosexuality should be <u>accepted by society</u>	Homosexuality should be <u>discouraged by society</u>	(VOL.) Both/Neither/DK/Ref
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	62	31	7
May 1-5, 2013	60	31	8
Mar 13-17, 2013	57	36	7
Jan 4-8, 2012	56	32	12
Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011	58	33	8
October, 2006 ⁶	51	38	11
December, 2004	49	44	7
June, 2003	47	45	8
September, 2000	50	41	9
August, 1999	49	44	7
October, 1997	46	48	6
June, 1997	45	50	5
October, 1996	44	49	7
April, 1996	44	49	7
October, 1995	45	50	5
April, 1995	47	48	5
October, 1994	46	48	6
July, 1994	46	49	5

ITEMS v-bb, dd-hh HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

⁶ In October, 2006 and earlier, both answer choices began: "Homosexuality is a way of life that should be..."

**NO ITEM cc
ITEMS dd-hh HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**

ASK ALL:

Q.51 Next, [**ASK ITEM ii FIRST, FOLLOWED BY RANDOMIZED ITEMS jj THROUGH mm AND RANDOMIZE STATEMENTS WITHIN PAIRS**]. [**IF NECESSARY**: "Which statement comes closer to your views, even if neither is exactly right?"] Next, [**NEXT PAIR**]

ITEMS ii-II HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

ASK ALL PHASE A:

mm.	I like elected officials who make compromises with <u>people they disagree with</u>	I like elected officials who <u>stick to their positions</u>	(VOL.) Both/Neither/ DK/Ref
Jan 23-Feb 9, 2014	56	39	5
Jan 15-19, 2014 ⁷	49	48	3
Jan 9-13, 2013 ⁸	50	44	6
Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011	40	54	7
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010 (RVs)	40	55	5

**NO ITEM nn
ITEMS oo-pp HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE
NO QUESTIONS 52, 59-99
QUESTIONS 53-58 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**

ASK ALL:

Q.100 Have you ever contributed money to a candidate running for public office or to a group working to elect a candidate?

ASK IF HAVE EVER CONTRIBUTED MONEY (Q.100=1):

Q.101 Have you done this over the last two years, that is, during or since the 2012 elections, or not? [**IF NECESSARY**: Have you contributed money to any candidates or political groups over the last two years, or not?]

Jan 23-Mar 16 <u>2014</u>		Jan 2-5 <u>2014</u>
30	Yes, have ever contributed	24
15	Yes, in last two years	14
16	No, not in last two years	10
*	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)	*
69	No, have never contributed	75
1	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)	1

⁷ In January 2014 and earlier, response items were not randomized.
⁸ In January 2013, question asked as a stand-alone item.

ASK IF HAVE CONTRIBUTED MONEY DURING 2012/2013 (Q.101=1):

Q.102 Over the last two years, would you say all of those contributions added up to more than \$100 or less than that?

ASK IF MORE THAN \$100 (Q.102=1):

Q.102a And did they add up to more than \$250 or not?

BASED ON TOTAL:

Jan 23-Mar 16 <u>2014</u>		Jan 2-5 <u>2014</u>
8	More than \$100	9
4	More than \$250	--
4	Less than \$250	--
*	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)	--
6	Less than \$100	5
*	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)	*
	<i>Haven't donated in last two years</i>	
85	<i>(Q.100=2,9 OR Q,101=2,9)</i>	86

NO QUESTIONS 103-104**ASK ALL:**

Q.105 **[IF Q100=1: And again,]** just thinking about the last two years...Please tell me if you have done any of the following. First, over the last two years have you **[INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE]**, or not? And over the last two years have you **[INSERT NEXT ITEM]**, or not?

	<u>Yes, have done this within last two years</u>	<u>No, have not done this within last two years</u>	<u>(VOL.) DK/Ref</u>
a. Worked or volunteered for a political candidate or campaign Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	8	92	*
b. Contacted any elected official Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	28	72	*

NO ITEM c

d. Attended a campaign event Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	15	84	*
---	----	----	---

QUESTIONS 106-107, B109, C111-112, C115 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**QUESTIONS B108, B110, C116-117 PREVIOUSLY RELEASED****NO QUESTIONS 113-114, 118-120**

RANDOMIZE IN BLOCKS:**Q121/121a/b, Q122/122a/b, Q123/a/b, Q124/a/b, Q125/a/b, Q126/a/b****ASK ALL PHASE A:**

Q.121 Do you think it is the responsibility of the federal government to make sure all Americans have health care coverage, or is that not the responsibility of the federal government?

ASK IF GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY (Q121=1):

Q.121a Should health insurance [READ AND RANDOMIZE]?

ASK IF NOT GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY (Q121=2):

Q.121b Should the government [READ AND RANDOMIZE]?

Jan 23-Feb 9

2014

47	Yes, government responsibility
21	Be provided through a single national health insurance system run by the government
	Continue to be provided through a mix of private insurance companies and government programs
23	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
2	
50	No, not government responsibility
6	Not be involved in providing health insurance at all
43	Continue programs like Medicare and Medicaid for seniors and the very poor
1	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
3	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)

Q.121 TREND:

	Yes, government <u>responsibility</u>	No, not government <u>responsibility</u>	(VOL.) <u>DK/Ref</u>
<i>Gallup: Nov 7-10, 2013</i>	42	56	2
<i>Gallup: Nov 15-18, 2012</i>	44	54	2
<i>Gallup: Nov 3-6, 2011</i>	50	46	4
<i>Gallup: Nov 4-7, 2010</i>	47	50	3
<i>Gallup: Nov 5-8, 2009</i>	47	50	3
<i>Gallup: November, 2008</i>	54	41	5
<i>Gallup: November, 2007</i>	64	33	3
<i>Gallup: November, 2006</i>	69	28	3
<i>Gallup: November, 2005</i>	58	38	4
<i>Gallup: November, 2004</i>	64	34	2
<i>Gallup: November, 2003</i>	59	39	2
<i>Gallup: November, 2002</i>	62	35	3
<i>Gallup: November, 2001</i>	62	34	4
<i>Gallup: September, 2000</i>	64	31	5
<i>Gallup: January, 2000</i>	59	38	3

RANDOMIZE IN BLOCKS:**Q121/121a/b, Q122/122a/b, Q123/a/b, Q124/a/b, Q125/a/b, Q126/a/b****ASK ALL PHASE A:**

Q.122 Which comes closer to your view about how to handle immigrants who are now living in the U.S. illegally? Should they **[READ AND RANDOMIZE]**

ASK IF NOT ELIGIBLE FOR CITIZENSHIP (Q122=1):

Q.122a Do you think there should be a national law enforcement effort to deport all immigrants who are now living in the U.S. illegally, or should that not be done?

ASK IF BE ELIGIBLE FOR CITIZENSHIP (Q122=2):

Q.122b And if immigrants meet these requirements, should they be eligible for citizenship? **[READ AND RANDOMIZE]**

Jan 23-Feb 9

2014

23	Not be eligible for citizenship
17	Should be national law enforcement effort to deport
5	Should not be national law enforcement effort to deport
1	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
76	Be eligible for citizenship if they meet certain requirements
20	Right away
54	Only after a period of time
1	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
2	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)

RANDOMIZE IN BLOCKS:**Q121/121a/b, Q122/122a/b, Q123/a/b, Q124/a/b, Q125/a/b, Q126/a/b****ASK ALL PHASE A:**

Q.123 What do you think is more important – to protect the right of Americans to own guns, OR to control gun ownership?

ASK IF MORE IMPORTANT TO PROTECT OWNERSHIP (Q123=1):

Q.123a And do you think there should be **[READ AND RANDOMIZE]**?

ASK IF MORE IMPORTANT TO CONTROL OWNERSHIP (Q123=2):

Q.123b And do you think **[READ AND RANDOMIZE]**?

Jan 23-Feb 9

2014

49	Protect the right of Americans to own guns
38	Some restrictions on gun ownership
11	No restrictions on gun ownership
1	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
48	Control gun ownership
35	Most Americans should be able to own guns with certain limits in place
12	Only law enforcement and security personnel should be able to own guns
1	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
3	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)

Q.123 TREND:

	Protect right of Americans to own guns	Control gun ownership	(VOL.) DK/Ref
May 1-5, 2013	48	50	2
Feb 13-18, 2013 (U)	46	50	4
Jan 9-13, 2013	45	51	5
Dec 17-19, 2012	42	49	9
July 26-29, 2012	46	47	6
Apr 4-15, 2012	49	45	6
Sep 22-Oct 4, 2011	47	49	5
Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011	48	47	6
Jan 13-16, 2011	49	46	6
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010	46	50	4
Mar 10-14, 2010	46	46	7

Q.123 TREND CONTINUED...

	Protect right of Americans to own guns	Control gun ownership	(VOL.) DK/Ref
Mar 31-Apr 21, 2009	45	49	6
April, 2008	37	58	5
November, 2007	42	55	3
April, 2007	32	60	8
February, 2004	37	58	5
June, 2003	42	54	4
May, 2000	38	57	5
April, 2000	37	55	8
March, 2000	29	66	5
June, 1999	33	62	5
May, 1999	30	65	5
December, 1993	34	57	9

RANDOMIZE IN BLOCKS:**Q121/121a/b, Q122/122a/b, Q123/a/b, Q124/a/b, Q125/a/b, Q126/a/b****ASK ALL PHASE A:**Q.124 Do you think abortion should be **[READ AND RANDOMIZE]****ASK IF LEGAL IN ALL/MOST (Q124=1):**

Q.124a Do you think there are any situations in which abortion should be restricted, or should there be no restrictions at all on abortion?

ASK IF ILLEGAL IN ALL/MOST (Q124=2):

Q.124b Do you think there are any situations in which abortion should be allowed, or should there be no situations at all where abortion is allowed?

Jan 23-Feb 9

2014

51	LEGAL in all or most cases
31	Situations in which abortion should be restricted
19	No restrictions at all on abortion
*	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
43	ILLEGAL in all or most cases
28	Situations in which abortion should be allowed
14	No situations where abortion should be allowed
1	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
6	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)

TREND FOR COMPARISON⁹:

	Legal in all <u>cases</u>	Legal in most <u>cases</u>	Illegal in most <u>cases</u>	Illegal in all <u>cases</u>	(VOL.) DK/Ref	NET <i>Legal in all/most</i>	NET <i>Illegal in all/most</i>
Jul 17-21, 2013	20	34	24	15	7	54	40
Oct 24-28, 2012	23	32	25	13	7	55	39
Apr 4-15, 2012	23	31	23	16	7	53	39
Nov 9-14, 2011	20	31	26	17	6	51	43
Sep 22-Oct 4, 2011	19	35	25	16	5	54	41
Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011	18	36	26	16	4	54	42
Jul 21-Aug 5, 2010	17	33	27	17	7	50	44
August 11-27, 2009	16	31	27	17	8	47	45
April, 2009	18	28	28	16	10	46	44
Late October, 2008	18	35	24	16	7	53	40
Mid-October, 2008	19	38	22	14	7	57	36
August, 2008	17	37	26	15	5	54	41
June, 2008	19	38	24	13	6	57	37
November, 2007	18	33	29	15	5	51	44

⁹ Trend for comparison question is worded: "Do you think abortion should be legal in all cases, legal in most cases, illegal in most cases, or illegal in all cases," with the categories read in reverse order for half the sample.

Q.124 TREND FOR COMPARISON CONTINUED...

	Legal in all cases	Legal in most cases	Illegal in most cases	Illegal in all cases	(VOL.) DK/Ref	NET Legal in all/most	NET Illegal in all/most
October, 2007	21	32	24	15	8	53	39
August, 2007	17	35	26	17	5	52	43
AP/Ipsos-Poll: February, 2006	19	32	27	16	6	51	43
ABC/WaPo: December, 2005	17	40	27	13	3	57	40
ABC/WaPo: April, 2005	20	36	27	14	3	56	41
ABC/WaPo: December, 2004	21	34	25	17	3	55	42
ABC/WaPo: May, 2004	23	31	23	20	2	54	43
ABC/WaPo: January, 2003	23	34	25	17	2	57	42
ABC/WaPo: August, 2001	22	27	28	20	3	49	48
ABC/BeliefNet: June, 2001	22	31	23	20	4	53	43
ABC/WaPo: January, 2001	21	38	25	14	1	59	39
ABC/WaPo: September, 2000 (RVs)	20	35	25	16	3	55	41
ABC/WaPo: July, 2000	20	33	26	17	4	53	43
ABC/WaPo: September, 1999	20	37	26	15	2	57	41
ABC/WaPo: March, 1999	21	34	27	15	3	55	42
ABC/WaPo: July, 1998	19	35	29	13	4	54	42
ABC/WaPo: August, 1996	22	34	27	14	3	56	41
ABC/WaPo: June, 1996	24	34	25	14	2	58	39
ABC/WaPo: October, 1995	26	35	25	12	3	61	37
ABC: September, 1995	24	36	25	11	4	60	36
ABC/WaPo: July, 1995	27	32	26	14	1	59	40

RANDOMIZE IN BLOCKS:**Q121/121a/b, Q122/122a/b, Q123/a/b, Q124/a/b, Q125/a/b, Q126/a/b****ASK ALL PHASE A:**Q.125 Thinking about the long term future of Social Security, do you think **[READ AND RANDOMIZE]**?**ASK IF ACCEPTABLE (Q125=1):**Q.125a Should Social Security be **[READ AND RANDOMIZE]**?**ASK IF UNACCEPTABLE (Q125=2):**Q.125b Should Social Security **[READ AND RANDOMIZE]**?

Jan 23-Feb 9

2014

31	Some reductions in benefits for future retirees need to be considered
6	Phased out as a government program ¹⁰
24	Maintained at a reduced level
1	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
67	Social Security benefits should not be reduced in any way
27	Cover more people, with greater benefits
37	Be kept about as it is
3	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)
3	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)

RANDOMIZE IN BLOCKS:**Q121/121a/b, Q122/122a/b, Q123/a/b, Q124/a/b, Q125/a/b, Q126/a/b****ASK ALL:**

Q.126 Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the government's collection of telephone and internet data as part of anti-terrorism efforts?

		(U) Jan 15-19 <u>2014</u>	(U) Jul 17-21 <u>2013</u>	(U) Jun 12-16 <u>2013</u>
Jan 23-Mar 16				
<u>2014</u>				
42	Approve	40	50	48
54	Disapprove	53	44	47
5	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)	6	6	4

¹⁰ From Jan. 23 to Jan. 29, 2014, item read: "Phased out completely."

RANDOMIZE IN BLOCKS:

Q121/121a/b, Q122/122a/b, Q123/a/b, Q124/a/b, Q125/a/b, Q126/a/b

ASK ALL:

Q.126 Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the government’s collection of telephone and internet data as part of anti-terrorism efforts?

ASK IF APPROVE IN PHASE A (Q126=1):

Q.126a Do you think the National Security Agency should be allowed to collect whatever data it needs, or should there be limits on what it collects?

ASK IF DISAPPROVE IN PHASE A (Q126=2):

Q.126b Do you think the National Security Agency should be prevented from collecting any data about U.S. citizens, or should it be allowed to collect some limited information?

Jan 23-Feb 9

2014¹¹

- 41 Approve
 - 15 NSA should be allowed to collect whatever data it needs
 - 26 Should be limits on what NSA collects
 - 1 Don't know/Refused **(VOL.)**
- 54 Disapprove
 - 15 NSA prevented from collecting any data on citizens
 - 38 NSA should be allowed to collect some limited information
 - 1 Don't know/Refused **(VOL.)**
 - 5 Don't know/Refused **(VOL.)**

QUESTIONS C127-128 PREVIOUSLY RELEASED

NO QUESTIONS 129-134, 136-138

QUESTIONS C135, B139 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

ASK ALL:

PARTY In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or independent?

ASK IF INDEP/NO PREF/OTHER/DK/REF (PARTY=3,4,5,9):

PARTYLN As of today do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?

				(VOL.)	(VOL.)	(VOL.)	Lean	Lean
	Republican	Democrat	Independent	No preference	Other party	DK/Ref	Rep	Dem
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	22	31	41	3	1	2	17	17
Feb 14-23, 2014	22	32	39	4	1	2	14	17
Jan 15-19, 2014	21	31	41	3	1	2	18	16
Dec 3-8, 2013	24	34	37	3	*	2	17	15
Oct 30-Nov 6, 2013	24	32	38	4	*	2	16	14
Oct 9-13, 2013	25	32	37	3	1	3	16	18
Sep 4-8, 2013	26	32	38	3	1	1	17	15
Jul 17-21, 2013	19	29	46	3	*	2	19	18
Jun 12-16, 2013	23	33	39	3	*	2	17	15
May 1-5, 2013	25	32	37	2	1	3	14	16
Mar 13-17, 2013	26	33	34	3	1	3	14	15
Yearly Totals								
2013	23.9	32.1	38.3	2.9	.5	2.2	16.0	16.0
2012	24.7	32.6	36.4	3.1	.5	2.7	14.4	16.1
2011	24.3	32.3	37.4	3.1	.4	2.5	15.7	15.6
2010	25.2	32.7	35.2	3.6	.4	2.8	14.5	14.1
2009	23.9	34.4	35.1	3.4	.4	2.8	13.1	15.7
2008	25.7	36.0	31.5	3.6	.3	3.0	10.6	15.2
2007	25.3	32.9	34.1	4.3	.4	2.9	10.9	17.0
2006	27.8	33.1	30.9	4.4	.3	3.4	10.5	15.1
2005	29.3	32.8	30.2	4.5	.3	2.8	10.3	14.9
2004	30.0	33.5	29.5	3.8	.4	3.0	11.7	13.4

¹¹ Q126a and Q126b asked in Phase A (Jan 23-Feb 9, 2014) only. Q126 data in this table is based only on interviews conducted in this period.

PARTY/PARTYLN CONTINUED...

	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>Independent</u>	(VOL.)	(VOL.)	<u>(VOL.)</u>	Lean	Lean
				<u>No</u>	<u>Other</u>			
2003	30.3	31.5	30.5	4.8	.5	2.5	12.0	12.6
2002	30.4	31.4	29.8	5.0	.7	2.7	12.4	11.6
2001	29.0	33.2	29.5	5.2	.6	2.6	11.9	11.6
2001 Post-Sept 11	30.9	31.8	27.9	5.2	.6	3.6	11.7	9.4
2001 Pre-Sept 11	27.3	34.4	30.9	5.1	.6	1.7	12.1	13.5
2000	28.0	33.4	29.1	5.5	.5	3.6	11.6	11.7
1999	26.6	33.5	33.7	3.9	.5	1.9	13.0	14.5
1998	27.9	33.7	31.1	4.6	.4	2.3	11.6	13.1
1997	28.0	33.4	32.0	4.0	.4	2.3	12.2	14.1
1996	28.9	33.9	31.8	3.0	.4	2.0	12.1	14.9
1995	31.6	30.0	33.7	2.4	.6	1.3	15.1	13.5
1994	30.1	31.5	33.5	1.3	--	3.6	13.7	12.2
1993	27.4	33.6	34.2	4.4	1.5	2.9	11.5	14.9
1992	27.6	33.7	34.7	1.5	0	2.5	12.6	16.5
1991	30.9	31.4	33.2	0	1.4	3.0	14.7	10.8
1990	30.9	33.2	29.3	1.2	1.9	3.4	12.4	11.3
1989	33	33	34	--	--	--	--	--
1987	26	35	39	--	--	--	--	--

ASK IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT (PARTY=1,2):

PARTYSTR Do you consider yourself a STRONG [Republican/Democrat] or NOT a strong [Republican/Democrat]?

	Strong	Not strong/	Strong	Not strong/
	<u>Republican</u>	<u>DK</u>	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>DK</u>
Jan 28-Mar 16, 2014 ¹²	11	11=22%	17	13=31%
Apr 4-15, 2012	14	10=24%	20	11=31%
Mar 8-14, 2011	12	12=24%	20	13=33%
Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011	14	10=24%	18	15=33%
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010	14	10=24%	19	13=32%
Oct 28-Nov 30, 2009	13	12=25%	20	11=32%
April, 2009	12	10=22%	20	13=33%
October, 2007 (SDT)	13	12=25%	19	14=33%
August, 2007	14	12=26%	18	14=32%
July, 2007	16	11=27%	19	13=32%
June, 2007	13	12=25%	19	15=34%
April, 2007	14	11=25%	15	13=28%
January, 2007	12	11=23%	17	14=31%
Mid-November, 2006	14	11=25%	22	14=36%
Late October, 2006	14	12=26%	18	14=32%
Early October, 2006	15	12=27%	19	15=34%
September, 2006	17	13=30%	18	16=34%
December, 2005	16	13=29%	20	14=34%
December, 2004	18	13=31%	19	15=34%
July, 2004	17	12=29%	20	13=33%
August, 2003	14	13=27%	15	16=31%
September, 2000	14	13=27%	19	15=34%
Late September, 1999	10	14=24%	15	16=31%
August, 1999	11	14=25%	15	18=33%
November, 1997	11	14=25%	14	18=32%
October, 1995	11	19=30%	14	16=30%
April, 1995	15	15=30%	14	15=29%
October, 1994	16	15=31%	18	14=32%
July, 1994	13	16=29%	15	18=33%
June, 1992	11	17=28%	14	18=32%

¹²

Item was asked Jan. 28-Mar 16, 2014 (N=9,570). Party totals shown here may differ from PARTY because of this.

PARTYSTR CONTINUED...

	Strong Republican	Not strong/ DK	Strong Democrat	Not strong/ DK
May, 1990	13	15=28%	16	17=33%
February, 1989	15	16=31%	17	21=38%
May, 1988	13	15=28%	19	19=38%
January, 1988	12	15=27%	19	20=39%
May, 1987	11	14=25%	18	19=37%

**QUESTION B140-142 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE
NO QUESTIONS 143-147**

ASK ALL REGISTERED VOTERS (REG=1) [N=8,000]:

Q.148 As you may know, primary elections, where parties select their nominees, take place in the months before general elections. Thinking about the primary elections for Congress this year, do you happen to know in what month your state's primary will be held? **[OPEN END; SINGLE PUNCH; DO NOT READ, USE PRECODES, IF RESPONDENT IS NOT SURE, DO NOT PROBE, ENTER AS DON'T KNOW]**

Jan 23-Mar 16

2014

12	Correct month given
17	Incorrect month given
69	Don't know/Refused

2 Lives in Louisiana¹³

ASK ALL REGISTERED VOTERS (REG=1) [N=8,000]:

Q.149 And how often would you say you vote in Congressional PRIMARY elections? Would you say you vote in Congressional primary elections **[READ IN ORDER]**?

TREND FOR COMPARISON¹⁴:

Jan 23-Mar 16

2014

		Jan 15-19 <u>2014</u>	Oct 9-13 <u>2013</u> ¹⁵	Sep 4-8 <u>2013</u>	Jul 17-21 <u>2013</u>
35	Always	42	52	50	46
22	Nearly always	22	18	24	23
17	Part of the time	16	16	13	13
24	Seldom or never	18	11	11	14
	Not registered with party/				
1	Can't vote in primaries (VOL.)	--	--	--	--
1	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)	2	3	2	4

ASK ALL:

TEAPARTY2 From what you know, do you agree or disagree with the Tea Party movement, or don't you have an opinion either way?

	Agree	Disagree	No opinion either way	(VOL.) Haven't heard of	(VOL.) Refused	Not heard of/ DK
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014	18	28	51	1	2	--
Oct 9-13, 2013	19	32	46	2	2	--
Jul 17-21, 2013	18	25	52	4	1	--
Jun 12-16, 2013	22	29	46	2	2	--
May 23-26, 2013	17	20	56	3	4	--
Feb 14-17, 2013	19	26	52	2	1	--
Dec 5-9, 2012	18	29	50	2	1	--
Oct 31-Nov 3, 2012 (RVs)	19	29	47	1	3	--
Oct 4-7, 2012	19	25	52	2	2	--

¹³ In Louisiana, a congressional primary election is not held.

¹⁴ In Jan. 15-19, 2014 survey and earlier, question did not have the word "Congressional."

¹⁵ In October 2013 and earlier, the fourth answer choice was "Seldom" instead of "Seldom or never."

TEAPARTY2 CONTINUED...

	Agree	Disagree	No opinion either way	(VOL.) Haven't heard of	(VOL.) Refused	Not heard of/ DK
Sep 12-16, 2012	18	26	53	2	2	--
Jul 16-26, 2012	16	27	54	2	1	--
Jun 28-Jul 9, 2012	19	27	49	3	2	--
Jun 7-17, 2012	21	25	52	2	1	--
May 9-Jun 3, 2012	16	25	54	2	3	--
Apr 4-15, 2012	20	26	50	3	2	--
Mar 7-11, 2012	19	29	48	2	2	--
Feb 8-12, 2012	18	25	53	2	2	--
Jan 11-16, 2012	20	24	52	2	2	--
Jan 4-8, 2012	18	25	52	2	3	--
Dec 7-11, 2011	19	27	50	2	2	--
Nov 9-14, 2011	20	27	51	1	1	--
Sep 22-Oct 4, 2011	19	27	51	2	1	--
Aug 17-21, 2011	20	27	50	1	1	--
Jul 20-24, 2011	20	24	53	1	1	--
Jun 15-19, 2011	20	26	50	3	2	--
May 25-30, 2011	18	23	54	2	2	--
Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011	22	29	47	1	1	--
Mar 8-14, 2011	19	25	54	1	1	--
Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011	20	25	52	2	2	--
Feb 2-7, 2011 ¹⁶	22	22	53	2	2	--
Jan 5-9, 2011	24	22	50	2	1	--
Dec 1-5, 2010	22	26	49	2	2	--
Nov 4-7, 2010	27	22	49	1	1	--
Oct 27-30, 2010 (RVs)	29	25	32	--	1	13
Oct 13-18, 2010 (RVs)	28	24	30	--	1	16
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010 (RVs)	29	26	32	--	1	13
Jul 21-Aug 5, 2010	22	18	37	--	1	21
Jun 16-20, 2010	24	18	30	--	*	27
May 20-23, 2010	25	18	31	--	1	25
Mar 11-21, 2010	24	14	29	--	1	31

ASK IF AGREE WITH TEA PARTY IN PHASE A (TEAPARTY2=1) [N=662]:

Q.150 Have you ever attended a Tea Party rally or meeting, or not? [IF YES: Was that in the last two years, or not?]

Jan 23-Feb 9

2014

18	Yes
8	Within the last two years
9	NOT within the last two years
*	Don't know if attended in last two years (VOL.)
82	No
0	Don't know/Refused (VOL.)

Key to Pew Research trends noted in the topline:

(SDT)	Pew Research Social and Demographic Trends
(U)	Pew Research Center/USA Today polls
(WP)	Pew Research Center/Washington Post polls

¹⁶ In the February 2-7, 2011, survey and before, question read "...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the Tea Party movement..." In October 2010 and earlier, question was asked only of those who had heard or read a lot or a little about the Tea Party. In May 2010 through October 2010, it was described as: "the Tea Party movement that has been involved in campaigns and protests in the U.S. over the past year." In March 2010 it was described as "the Tea Party protests that have taken place in the U.S. over the past year."

**PEW RESEARCH CENTER
AMERICAN TRENDS PANEL WAVE 1
FINAL TOPLINE
MARCH 19-APRIL 29, 2014
TOTAL N=3,308
WEB RESPONDENTS N=2,901
PHONE RESPONDENTS N=407¹⁷**

**QUESTIONS 1-2, 7-10, 16-25, 30-36 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE
NO QUESTIONS 3-6, 11-15, 26-29, 37-40**

ASK ALL:

Now, thinking about the people you talk with, whether in person, over the phone, or electronically...
Q.41 How often do you discuss government and politics with others?

<u>Mar 19-Apr 29, 2014</u>		
Based on total [N=3,308]	Based on web respondents [N=2,901]	
13	13	Nearly every day
29	29	A few times a week
26	29	A few times a month
32	29	Less often
*	*	No answer

**QUESTION 42 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE
NO QUESTION 43**

ASK ALL:

Q.44 Which of the following statements best describes you?

<u>Mar 19-Apr 29, 2014</u>		
Based on total [N=3,308]	Based on web respondents [N=2,901]	
35	36	Most of my close friends share my views on government and politics
39	41	Some of my close friends share my views, but many do not
26	23	I don't really know what most of my close friends think about government and politics
*	*	No answer

**NO QUESTIONS 45, 49-52
QUESTIONS 46-48, 53-60 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE**

¹⁷ Question wording in this topline is that from the web version of the survey. For those questions asked on the phone, wording was adapted slightly so that it could be asked over the phone. Question wording for the phone version of the survey is available on request.